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Abstract
A Bayesian agent experiences gain-loss utility each period over changes in belief
about future consumption (“news utility”), with diminishing sensitivity over the mag-
nitude of news. We show the agent’s preference between an information structure that
delivers news gradually and another that resolves all uncertainty at once depends on his
consumption ranking of different states. One-shot resolution is better than gradual bad
news, but it is not optimal among all information structures (under common functional
forms). In a dynamic cheap-talk framework where a benevolent sender communicates
the state over multiple periods, the babbling equilibrium is essentially unique without
loss aversion. More loss-averse agents may enjoy higher news utility in equilibrium,
contrary to the commitment case. We characterize the family of gradual good news
equilibria that exist with high enough loss aversion, and find the sender conveys pro-
gressively larger pieces of good news. We discuss applications to media competition
and game shows.
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1 Introduction
People are sometimes willing to pay a cost to change how they receive news over time, even
when the information in question does not help them make better decisions. Consider the
following two scenarios:
Scenario I. Ann interviews for her dream job and is told that she will receive the decision
by email next week. Ann knows that if the firm decides to reject her, she will receive the
rejection email next Friday. But if the firm decides to hire her, she could hear back on any
of the weekdays — in other words, no news is bad news. To avoid experiencing multiple
instances of disappointment over the week in case she does not hear back for several days,
Ann sets up an email filter to automatically redirect any emails from the firm into a holding
tank, then releases all messages from the holding tank into her inbox at 5PM next Friday.
Scenario II. Once a week, Bob phones his relative who lives in another country. In
today’s phone call, Bob learns that the relative has been quarantined due to possible exposure
to a dangerous virus. If the relative has been infected, she will suddenly fall sick sometime
next week. But if she remains healthy by their next weekly phone call, then she has definitely
not been infected. Bob decides to change his routine and calls the relative daily over the
next week, because he prefers to receive multiple pieces of reassuring news about her health.
In these scenarios, agents may be willing to exert costly effort to modify their informa-
tional environments because they experience diminishingly sensitive psychological reactions
to good and bad news. They are elated by good news and disappointed by bad news in every
period, and multiple congruent pieces of news received in different periods carry a greater
total emotional impact than if the pieces were aggregated and the lump-sum news delivered
in a single period. This kind of psychological consideration also influences how people convey
news to others. When CEOs announce earnings forecasts to shareholders and when organiza-
tion leaders update their teams about recent developments, they are surely mindful of their
information’s emotional impact (in addition to its possible instrumental value). Finally, the
psychological effects of news also play a prominent role in designing entertainment content
like game shows, where the audience experiences positive and negative reactions over time
to news and developments that have no bearing on their personal decision-making.
In this paper, we study the implications of diminishingly sensitive reactions to news
for informational preference and dynamic communication. A person’s future consumption
depends on an unknown state of the world. In each period, he observes some information
about the state and experiences gain-loss utility over the change in his belief about said
future consumption (“news utility”). How does this person prefer to learn about the state
over time? If there is another agent who knows the state and who wants to maximize the
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first person’s expected welfare, how will this informed agent communicate her information?
Our main innovation is the focus on diminishing sensitivity — a classical but surprisingly
under-studied assumption. Diminishing sensitivity in reference dependence traces back to
Kahneman and Tversky (1979)’s original formulation of prospect theory. Based on Weber’s
law and experimental findings about human perception, these authors envisioned a gain-loss
utility based on deviations from a reference point, where larger deviations carry smaller
marginal effects. Diminishing sensitivity is mentioned in much of the subsequent work on
reference-dependent preferences, including Kőszegi and Rabin (2009), who first introduced a
model of news utility. In almost all cases, however, researchers then specialize for simplicity
to a two-part linear gain-loss utility function that allows for loss aversion but precludes
diminishing sensitivity. Four decades since Kahneman and Tversky (1979)’s publication,
O’Donoghue and Sprenger (2018)’s review of the ensuing literature summarizes the situation:
“Most applications of reference-dependent preferences focus entirely on loss
aversion, and ignore the possibility of diminishing sensitivity [...] The literature
still needs to develop a better sense of when diminishing sensitivity is important.”
We show that diminishing sensitivity leads to novel and testable predictions in the domain
of information design. The first prediction concerns the choice between gradual information
and one-shot information. As Kőszegi and Rabin (2009) point out, the two-part linear news-
utility model predicts that people prefer resolving all uncertainty in one period (“one-shot
resolution”) over any other dynamic information structure. At the same time, some other
theories (e.g., Ely, Frankel, and Kamenica (2015)’s suspense and surprise utility) predict
that one-shot resolution is the worst possible information structure. Unlike these theories
that predict an agent will either always choose or always avoid one-shot information, news
utility with diminishing sensitivity predicts the same person can make different choices in
different situations — in particular, it depends on his consumption ranking over the states.
In a world with two possible states (A and B) associated with two different consumption
prizes, suppose state A realizes if and only if a sequence of intermediate events all take
place successfully over time. We show that when the agent prefers the consumption prize
in state A, he will choose to observe the intermediate events resolve in real-time (gradual
information). But when he prefers the consumption prize in state B, he will choose to only
learn the final state (one-shot information). At the population level, this result shows that
an underlying diversity in consumption preferences within a society can create a diversity in
informational preferences, and suggests a mechanism for media competition. The result also
rationalizes a “sudden death” format often found in game shows, where the contestant must
overcome every challenge in a sequence to win the grand prize (as opposed to the grand prize
being contingent on beating at least one of several challenges.)
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The above relationship between consumption preference and informational preference
arises because diminishing sensitivity generates a preference over the direction of news skew-
ness. We show that information structures where good news arrives all at once but bad
news arrives gradually in small pieces — such as waiting for the job offer in Ann’s scenario
— are strictly worse than one-shot resolution. On the other hand, we also show that some
information structures with the opposite skewness — good news arrives gradually but bad
news all at once, such as Bob’s information about his relative’s health when he makes daily
phone calls — are strictly better than one-shot resolution for a class of news-utility functions
with diminishing sensitivity. This class includes the commonly used power-function specifi-
cation. It also includes a tractable quadratic specification, whenever diminishing sensitivity
is strong enough relative to the degree of loss aversion.
Another novel consequence of diminishing sensitivity is a credibility problem for an in-
formed benevolent sender who knows the state but lacks commitment power. The informa-
tion structures that strictly improve on one-shot resolution may not be implementable in the
equilibrium of a cheap-talk game. In the bad state, the sender may strictly prefer to lie and
convey a positive message intended for the good state. This temptation exists despite the
fact that the sender is far-sighted and maximizes the receiver’s total news utility over time.
The intuition is that when the sender knows the state is bad, she also knows the receiver
will experience disappointment in the future. Diminishing sensitivity implies the receiver’s
marginal utility of unwarranted partial good news today is larger than his marginal disutility
of heightened future disappointment. This perverse incentive to provide false hope in the
bad state may prevent any meaningful communication at all. Indeed, we show that if the
receiver has diminishing sensitivity but no loss aversion (or has low loss aversion), then ev-
ery equilibrium is payoff-equivalent to the babbling equilibrium, which implements one-shot
resolution as the receiver’s belief stays constant until the state is exogenously revealed in the
final period. But, high enough loss aversion can restore the equilibrium credibility of good-
news messages by increasing the future disappointment cost of inducing false hope in the bad
state. As a consequence, receivers with higher loss aversion may enjoy higher equilibrium
payoffs, which does not happen when the sender has commitment power. Diminishing sen-
sitivity thus drives a wedge between the commitment solution and the equilibrium outcome,
whereas the two coincide without it.
With enough loss aversion, there exist non-babbling equilibria featuring gradual good
news. We characterize the entire family of such equilibria and study how quickly the receiver
learns the state. For a class of news-utility functions that include the square-root and
quadratic specifications mentioned before, the sender always conveys progressively larger
pieces of good news over time, so the receiver’s equilibrium belief grows at an increasing
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rate in the good state. The idea is that in equilibrium, the sender must be made indifferent
between giving false hope and telling the truth in the bad state, and diminishing sensitivity
implies that sustaining said indifference requires a greater amount of false hope when the
receiver’s current belief is more optimistic. This conclusion also puts a uniform bound on the
number of periods of informative communication across all time horizons and all equilibria.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the timing of events
and introduces a model of news utility. This model is then embedded into three different
environments in the next three sections. Section 3 considers agents choosing between gradual
information and one-shot information about the state, and how their choices depend on
their consumption rankings of the states. Section 4 studies a sender-receiver framework,
where a benevolent informed sender with commitment power communicates the state to
a receiver who experiences news utility. Section 5 drops the commitment assumption and
focuses on the credibility problems in the resulting cheap-talk game. Section 6 discusses
related literature and contrasts our results with the predictions of other models of preference
over non-instrumental information. It also relates our theoretical results to experiments on
preference over information. Section 7 concludes. As an extension, Online Appendix OA
2 looks at a variant of the model without a deterministic horizon. Proofs of main results
appear in the Appendix and proofs of remaining results appear in the Online Appendix.
2 Model
2.1 Timing of Events
We consider a discrete-time model with periods 0, 1, 2, ...,T , where T ≥ 2. There is a finite
state space Θ with |Θ| = K ≥ 2. There is an agent who experiences news utility over
consumption (to be explained below). In state θ, the agent receives a consumption prize
cθ ∈ R in period T , deriving from it consumption utility v(cθ) where v is strictly increasing.
There is no consumption in other periods, and we assume that cθ′ 6= cθ′′ when θ′ 6= θ′′ . We
may normalize without loss minθ∈Θ[v(cθ)] = 0, maxθ∈Θ[v(cθ)] = 1.
The agent starts with a prior belief pi0 ∈ ∆(Θ) about the state, where pi0(θ) > 0 for
all θ ∈ Θ. In every period t = 1, ..., T, the agent observes some information and forms the
Bayesian posterior belief pit ∈ ∆(Θ) about the state. The information is non-instrumental
in that no actions taken in these interim periods affect the state or the consumption utility
in period T .
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2.2 News Utility
The agent derives utility based on changes in his belief about the final period’s consumption.
Specifically, he has a continuous news-utility function N : ∆(Θ)×∆(Θ)→ R, mapping his
pair of new and old beliefs about the state into a real-valued felicity.1 He receives utility
N(pit | pit−1) at the end of period 1 ≤ t ≤ T. Utility flow is undiscounted and the agent has
the same N in all periods,2 so his total payoff is ∑Tt=1N(pit | pit−1) + v(c). We assume for
every pi ∈ ∆(Θ), both N(· | pi) and N(pi | ·) are continuously differentiable except possibly
at pi.
For many of our results, we study a mean-based news-utility model. Kőszegi and Rabin
(2009) discuss this model, but mostly focus on another model that makes percentile-by-
percentile comparisons between old and new beliefs. We use the mean-based model to derive
the implications of diminishing sensitivity in the simplest setup. The agent applies a gain-
loss utility function, µ : [−1, 1] → R, to changes in expected period-T consumption utility.
That is, N(pit | pit−1) = µ ([∑θ∈Θ pit(θ)v(cθ)]− [∑θ∈Θ pit−1(θ)v(cθ)]). Throughout we assume
µ is continuous, strictly increasing, twice differentiable except possibly at 0, and µ(0) = 0.
We maintain further assumptions on µ to reflect diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion.
Definition 1. Say µ satisfies diminishing sensitivity if µ′′(x) < 0 and µ′′(−x) > 0 for all
x > 0. Say µ satisfies (weak) loss aversion if −µ(−x) ≥ µ(x) for all x > 0. There is strict
loss aversion if −µ(−x) > µ(x) for all x > 0.
We now discuss two important functional forms of µ. In Online Appendix OA 3.2.2,
we compare the optimal information structures for this model and for Kőszegi and Rabin
(2009)’s percentile-based model, a class of news-utility functions that do not admit mean-
based representations.
2.2.1 Quadratic News Utility
The quadratic news-utility function µ : [−1, 1]→ R is given by
µ(x) =
αpx− βpx
2 x ≥ 0
αnx+ βnx2 x < 0
1Since different states lead to different levels of consumption, beliefs over states induce beliefs over con-
sumption.
2Our preference satisfies Segal (1990)’s time neutrality axiom. We abstract away from preferences for
early or late resolution of uncertainty.
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Figure 1: Examples of quadratic news-utility functions in the family αp = α, αn = λα,
βp = β, βn = λβ. Grey curve: α = 2, β = 1, λ = 1. Red curve: α = 2, β = 1, λ = 2. Blue
curve: α = 2, β = 0.8, λ = 1.
with αp, βp, αn, βn > 0. So we have
µ
′(x) =
αp − 2βpx x > 0αn + 2βnx x < 0 , µ
′′(x) =
−2βp x > 02βn x < 0 .
The parameters αp, αn control the extent of loss aversion near 0, while βp, βn determine the
amount of curvature — i.e., the second derivative of µ. The maintained general assumptions
on µ imply the following parametric restrictions.
1. Monotonicity: αp > 2βp and αn > 2βn. These inequalities hold if and only if µ is
strictly increasing.
2. Loss aversion: αn − αp ≥ (βn − βp)z for all z ∈ [0, 1]. This condition is equivalent to
loss aversion from Definition 1 for this class of news-utility functions.
A family of quadratic news-utility functions that satisfy these two restrictions can be con-
structed by choosing any α > 2β > 0 and λ ≥ 1, then set αp = α, αn = λα, βp = β, βn = λβ.
Figure 1 plots some of these news-utility functions for different values of α, β, and λ.
The quadratic news utilities are simple enough to be tractable but rich enough to exhibit
both diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion. We show later in Section 4.5 that we can
explicitly characterize the optimal information structure for these utility functions.
2.2.2 Power-Function News Utility
The power-function news-utility µ : [−1, 1]→ R is given by
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µ(x) =
x
α x ≥ 0
−λ|x|β x < 0
with 0 < α, β < 1 and λ ≥ 1. Parameters α, β determine the degree of diminishing sensitivity
to good news and bad news, while λ controls the extent of loss aversion. This class of
functions nests the square-root case when α = β = 0.5 and is the only class of gain-loss
functions to appear in Tversky and Kahneman (1992).
3 Choosing Between Gradual Information and One-
Shot Information
Consider an environment where a sequence of signal realizations gradually determine a binary
state. We show that agents with opposite consumption preferences over the two states can
exhibit opposite preferences when choosing between observing the signals as they arrive or
only learning the final state.
There are two states of the world, A and B. In each period t = 1, 2, ..., T , a binary signal
Xt realizes, where P[Xt = 1] = qt with 0 < qt < 1. Each Xt is independent of the other ones.
The signals determine the state. If Xt = 1 for all t, then the state is A. Otherwise, when
Xt = 0 for at least one t, the state is B. At time 0, the agent chooses between observing the
realizations of the signals (Xt)Tt=1 in real time (gradual information), or only learning the
state of the world at the end of period T (one-shot information).
As an example, imagine a televised debate between two political candidates A and B
where A loses as soon as she makes a “gaffe” during the debate.3 If A does not make any
gaffes, then A wins. In this example, {Xt = 1} corresponds to the event of that candidate A
does not make a gaffe during the t-th minute of the debate. States A and B correspond to
candidates A and B winning the debate. An individual chooses between watching the debate
live (i.e., observing the stochastic process (Xt) in real time) or only reading the outcome of
the debate the following morning (i.e., getting one-shot information about the state).
The individual could be someone who benefits from candidate A winning the debate (that
is, v(cA) = 1, v(cB) = 0), or someone who benefits from candidate B winning the debate
(that is, v(cA) = 0, v(cB) = 1). The agent forms the Bayesian belief pit ∈ [0, 1] about the
probability of state A at the end of each period t, starting with the correct Bayesian prior
pi0. For notational convenience, we also write ρt = 1− pit as the belief in state B at the end
3Augenblick and Rabin (2019) use a similar example of political gaffes to illustrate Bayesian belief move-
ments.
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of t, with the prior ρ0 = 1−pi0. If the agent prefers state A, he gets news utility µ(pit−pit−1)
at the end of period t. If the agent prefers state B, then he gets news utility µ(ρt − ρt−1)
Under diminishing sensitivity, someone rooting for state B prefers to only learn the final
state to avoid piecemeal bad new, while someone hoping for state A wants to watch the
events unfold in real time to “celebrate the small victories,” provided they are not too loss
averse. The next proposition formalizes this intuition. To quantify the amount of loss
aversion, we consider the parametric class of λ-scaled news-utility functions. We fix some
µ˜pos : [0, 1]→ R+, strictly increasing and strictly concave with µ˜pos(0) = 0, and consider the
family of µ’s given by µλ(x) = µ˜pos(x), µλ(−x) = −λµ˜pos(x) for x > 0 as we vary λ ≥ 1.
Proposition 1. Consider a class of λ-scaled news-utility functions (µλ)λ≥1. For any λ ≥ 1,
the agent chooses one-shot information over gradual information when v(cA) = 0, v(cB) = 1.
There exists some λ¯ > 1 so that for any 1 ≤ λ ≤ λ¯, the agent chooses gradual information
over one-shot information when v(cA) = 1, v(cB) = 0.
Here the bound on loss aversion λ¯ depends on the degree of diminishing sensitivity in
µ˜pos, but it is always strictly larger than 1 when µ˜pos is strictly concave.
Recall Ann and Bob from the introduction, who choose to undertake costly effort to
change their informational environments. This result explains their behavior. In Ann’s job-
application scenario, T = 5 and the event {Xt = 1} corresponds to not getting a job offer
from the firm on the t-th weekday. State A is being rejected by the firm and state B is being
hired by the firm, so v(cA) < v(cB). By Proposition 1, the gradual information inherent in
her scenario is strictly worse than one-shot information, which Ann implements using the
email filter.
In Bob’s scenario with the quarantined relative, T = 7 and {Xt = 1} corresponds to his
relative not falling sick on the t-th day from today. State A is the relative not being infected
by the virus, while state B is the relative being infected, so v(cA) > v(cB). By Proposition
1, if Bob’s loss aversion is low, he strictly prefers gradual information about the relative’s
health over the one-shot information of his default informational environment. So, he is
willing to pay a cost to switch from weekly calls to daily calls.
Proposition 1 carries implications about information choices at the population level and
at the individual level.
At the population level, Proposition 1 shows that society can exhibit an endogenous
diversity of information preferences, driven by an underlying diversity of consumption pref-
erences. Individuals with the same news-utility function µ can nevertheless choose to learn
about the state of the world in two different ways, if they have opposite rankings of the states
in terms of their consumption levels. So heterogeneous consumption preferences generate
heterogeneous information preferences.
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This observation suggests a possible mechanism for media competition: if the realization
of some state A depends on a series of smaller events, then some news sources may cover
these small events in detail as they happen, while other sources may choose to only report
the final outcome. If there is a heterogeneity of tastes over states in the society, then viewers
will sort between these two kinds of news sources based on how they rank states A and B
in terms of consumption.
At the individual level, Proposition 1 shows that the same person may choose gradual
information in one situation but one-shot information in another, even if his news-utility
function remains stable. For example, if political candidate X wins any debate when and
only when she does not make a gaffe, an agent may choose to watch a debate between
candidates X and Y but refuse to watch a debate between candidates X and Z, because he
prefers X over Y but Z over X.
By contrast, related theories about behavioral information preference tend to predict that
the agent either always prefers one-shot information in all situations, or always prefers every
other information structure to one-shot information in all situations. The theories that do
not allow situation-dependent information choice include news-utility without diminishing
sensitivity (even if the agent is gain-loving instead of loss-averse, as in Goette, Graeber,
Kellogg, and Sprenger (2020)), anticipatory utility, and suspense and surprise.
Proposition 2. The following models predict that the agent will not change his choice be-
tween gradual information and one-shot information when the sign of v(cA)−v(cB) changes.
1. News utility with a two-part linear µ, where µ(x) = x for x ≥ 0 and µ(x) = λx for
x < 0, with any λ ≥ 0.
2. Anticipatory utility where the agent gets either u(pit) or u(1−pit) in period t depending
on his preference over states A and B, with u an increasing, weakly concave function.
3. Ely, Frankel, and Kamenica (2015)’s “suspense and surprise” utility.
A final application of Proposition 1 concerns the design of game shows. Consider a game
show featuring a single contestant who will win either $100,000 or nothing depending on her
performance across five rounds.4 The audience, empathizing with the contestant, derives
news utility µ(pit − pit−1) at the end of round t, where pit is the contestant’s probability of
winning the prize based on the first t rounds. One possible format (“sudden death”) features
five easy rounds each with w = 0.51/5 ≈ 87% winning probability, where the contestant
wins $100,000 if she wins all five rounds. Another possible format (“repêchage”) involves
4This can be thought of as a stylized payout structure for game shows like American Ninja Warrior and
Who Wants to Be a Millionaire.
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five hard rounds each with 1 − w winning probability, but the contestant wins $100,000 as
soon as she wins any round. Both formats lead to the same distribution over final outcomes
and generate the same amount of suspense and surprise utilities à la Ely, Frankel, and
Kamenica (2015). Proposition 1 shows the first format induces more news utility than one-
shot information (which could correspond to not watching the game show and simply looking
up the contestant’s outcome later) for audience members who are not too loss averse, while
the second format is worse than one-shot information for all audience members. Consistent
with this prediction, the vast majority of game shows resemble the first format more than
the second format.
4 Benevolent Informed Sender with Commitment Power
In this section, we consider a sender-receiver framework where the agent with news-utility
preference plays the role of the receiver. A benevolent sender with commitment power
knows the state and communicates it to the receiver over T periods. After setting up the
environment, we provide a general inductive procedure to solve the sender’s problem. We
show that information structures featuring gradual bad news, one-shot good news are strictly
worse than one-shot resolution, then identify sufficient conditions that imply the optimal
information structure features gradual good news, one-shot bad news. We illustrate these
results with the quadratic news-utility specification, finding that the said sufficient conditions
hold whenever diminishing sensitivity is sufficiently strong relative to loss aversion, and
explicitly characterize the optimal information structure.
4.1 The Sender-Receiver Framework
In period 0, the sender chooses a finite message space M and a strategy σ = (σt)T−1t=1 , where
σt(· | ht−1, θ) ∈ ∆(M) is a distribution over messages in period t that depends on the
public history ht−1 ∈ H t−1 := (M)t−1 of messages sent so far, as well as the true state θ.
The sender can commit to any information structure (M,σ), which then becomes common
knowledge between the players. At the start of period 1, the sender privately observes the
state’s realization, then sends a message in each of the periods 1, 2, ..., T −1 according to the
strategy σ. The sender is benevolent and maximizes the receiver’s expected total welfare.5
At the end of period t for 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1, the receiver forms the Bayesian posterior belief
pit about the state after the on-path history ht ∈ H t of t messages. This belief is rational and
5The problem of a benevolent sender with commitment power is equivalent to a single-agent framework
where the receiver chooses an information structure for himself.
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calculated with the knowledge of the information structure (M,σ). In period T, the receiver
exogenously and perfectly learns the true state θ, consumes cθ, and the game ends.
Since the receiver is Bayesian, the sender faces cross-state constraints in choosing the
receiver’s belief paths. In view of diminishing sensitivity, one might conjecture that the
sender should concentrate all bad news in period 1 if the state is bad, and deliver equally-
sized pieces of good news in periods 1, 2, 3, ... if the state is good. But these belief paths
are infeasible, since a Bayesian audience who knows this strategy and does not receive bad
news in period 1 will conclusively infer that the state is good. The receiver would not judge
subsequent communication from the sender as further good news or derive positive news
utility from them. Indeed, if the sender wishes to use some message m ∈ M to convey
positive but inconclusive news in the good state, then in the bad state the same message
must also be sent with positive probability – otherwise, receiving this information in the first
period would amount to conclusive evidence of the good state. These cross-state constraints
imply distortions from perfect “consumption smoothing” of good news, as we show later.
When K = 2, we label two states as Good and Bad, Θ = {G,B}, so that v(cG) = 1,
v(cB) = 0. We also abuse the notation pit to mean pit(G) in the case of binary states.
In this environment, the sender has perfect information about the receiver’s future con-
sumption level once she observes the state. Online Appendix OA 3.2 discusses an extension
where the sender’s information is imperfect, so that there is residual uncertainty about the
receiver’s consumption conditional on the state (i.e., given the sender’s private information).
4.2 A General Backwards-Induction Procedure
For f : ∆(Θ)→ R, let cavf be the concavification of f — that is, the smallest concave func-
tion that dominates f pointwise. Concavification plays a key role in solving this information
design problem, just as in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) and Aumann and Maschler (1995).
For piT−2, piT−1 ∈ ∆(Θ) two beliefs about the state, let UT−1(piT−1 | piT−2) be the sum of
the receiver’s expected news utilities in periods T − 1 and T , if he enters period T − 1 with
belief piT−2 and updates it to piT−1. More precisely,
UT−1(piT−1 | piT−2) := N(piT−1 | piT−2) +
∑
θ∈Θ
piT−1(θ) ·N(1θ | piT−1),
where 1θ is the degenerate belief putting probability 1 on the state θ. Note that by the
martingale property of beliefs, if the receiver holds belief piT−1 at the end of period T − 1,
then state θ must then realize in period T with probability piT−1(θ).
Let U∗T−1(piT−2) := (cavUT−1(· | piT−2)) (piT−2). As we will show in the proof of Proposition
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3, U∗T−1(piT−2) is the value function of the sender when the receiver enters period T − 1 with
belief piT−2. Continuing inductively, using the value function U∗t+1(·) for t ≥ 1, we may define
Ut(pit | pit−1) := N(pit | pit−1) + U∗t+1(pit), which leads to the period t value function U∗t (x) :=
(cavUt(· | x)) (x). The maximum expected news utility across all information structures is
U∗1 (pi0), and the sequence of concavifications give the optimal information structure.
Proposition 3. The maximum expected news utility across all information structures is
U∗1 (pi0). There is an information structure (M,σ) with |M | = K attaining this maximum,
with the property that after each on-path public history ht−1 associated with belief pit−1, the
sender’s strategy σt(· | ht−1, θ) induces posterior qk at the end of period t with probability wk,
for some q1, ..., qK ∈ ∆(Θ), w1, ..., wK ≥ 0, satisfying ∑Kk=1wk = 1, ∑Kk=1wkqk = pit−1, and
U∗t (pit−1) =
∑K
k=1w
kUt(qk | pit−1).
In practice, explicitly calculating the solution to the sender’s problem may be difficult,
since the function to be concavified in each period depends on both current period’s belief
and next period’s belief — a key feature of news utility. Nevertheless, in Section 4.5 we show
that the optimal information structure can be tractably characterized for the quadratic news
utilities we introduced. In Sections 4.3 and 4.4, we discuss some qualitative features of the
receiver’s preference over information structures, including the ranking of one-shot resolution
among all information structures.
A perhaps surprising implication is that the receiver only needs a binary message space
if there are two states of the world, regardless of the shape or curvature of the news-utility
function N. Figure 2 illustrates the concavification procedure in an environment with two
equally likely states, T = 5, and the mean-based news-utility function µ(x) =
√
x for x ≥ 0,
µ(x) = −1.5√−x for x < 0. In the optimal information structure, there are two signals,
{g, b}. The sender sends the conclusive bad-news signal b in a random period when θ = B,
and sends the other signal g in the other periods. Signal g is sent in every period if θ = G.
This means g is a partial good-news signal that makes the receiver more optimistic about
θ = G, but receiving the b signal is conclusive bad news.
Remark 1. The information-design problem imposes additional constraints relative to a
habit-formation model. To see this, consider a “relaxed” version of the sender’s problem in
the binary-states case where she simply chooses some xt ∈ [0, 1] each period for 1 ≤ t ≤ T−1,
depending on the realization of θ. The receiver gets µ(xt − xt−1) in period 1 ≤ t ≤ T , with
the initial condition x0 = pi0 and the terminal condition xT = 1 if θ = G, xT = 0 if θ = B.
One interpretation of the relaxed problem is that the sender chooses the receiver’s sequence
of beliefs only subject to the constraint that the initial belief in period 0 is pi0 and the final
belief in period T puts probability 1 on the true state. The belief paths do not have to be
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Figure 2: The concavifications giving the optimal information structure with horizon T = 5,
mean-based news-utility function µ(x) =

√
x for x ≥ 0
−1.5√−x for x < 0 , prior pi0 = 0.5. The dashed
vertical line in the t-th graph marks the receiver’s belief in θ = G conditional on not having
heard any bad news by the start of period t. The y-axis shows the sum of news utility this
period and the value function of entering next period with a certain belief. In the good
state of the world, the receiver’s belief in θ = G grows at increasing rates across the periods,
0.5 → 0.556 → 0.626 → 0.715 → 0.834 → 1. In the bad state of the world, the receiver’s
belief follows the same path as in the good state up until the random period when conclusive
bad news arrives.
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Bayesian. Another interpretation is that xt is not a belief, but a consumption level for period
t. The receiver’s welfare in period t only depends on a gain-loss utility based on how current
period’s consumption differs from that of period t−1. Provided µ has diminishing sensitivity,
Jensen’s inequality implies that in this relaxed problem, any sender strategy that induces an
unevenly increasing (xt)Tt=0 when θ = G (as in the optimal solution to the information-design
problem in Figure 2) is strictly worse than choosing xt = pi0 + tT (1 − pi0) in period t when
θ = G.
4.3 Diminishing Sensitivity and the Sub-Optimality of One-Shot
Resolution
An information structure features one-shot resolution if P[pit 6= pit−1 for at most one 1 ≤ t ≤
T ] = 1. That is, the receiver’s belief path is almost surely constant in all except one period.
In Kőszegi and Rabin (2009)’s model of news utility without diminishing sensitivity, one-shot
resolution is optimal among all information structures.6 But this conclusion does not hold
when we allow for diminishing sensitivity.
We give a sufficient condition on the news-utility function for one-shot resolution to be
strictly suboptimal. Let θH , θL ∈ Θ be the states with the highest and lowest consumption
utilities. Let 1H , 1L ∈ ∆(Θ) represent degenerate beliefs in states θH and θL and let v0 :=
Eθ∼pi0 (v(cθ)) be the ex-ante expected future consumption utility. The symbol ⊕ denotes the
mixture between two beliefs in ∆(Θ).
Proposition 4. For any T and Θ, one-shot resolution is strictly suboptimal if
lim
→0+
N(1H | (1− )1H ⊕ 1L)

+N(1H | pi0)−N(1L | pi0)
> lim
→0+
N(1H | pi0)−N((1− )1H ⊕ 1L | pi0)

−N(1L | 1H).
For the mean-based news-utility model, this condition is equivalent to
µ(1− v0)− µ(−v0) + µ′(0+)− µ′(1− v0) + µ(−1) > 0.
In fact, the proof of Proposition 4 shows that whenever its condition is satisfied, some
information structure featuring “gradual good news and one-shot bad news” (to be defined
precisely in the next subsection) strictly improves on one-shot resolution.
6Kőszegi and Rabin (2009) showed this for their percentile-based model of news utility with binary states,
while Dillenberger and Raymond (2020) proved the same also holds for arbitrarily many states.
14
We can interpret Proposition 4’s sufficient condition as “strong enough diminishing sensi-
tivity relative to loss aversion.” Evidently, µ(1−v0)−µ(−v0) > 0, so the condition is satisfied
whenever µ′(0+)− µ′(1− v0) + µ(−1) > 0. We always have µ′(0+)− µ′(1− v0) > 0, and it
increases when µ becomes more concave in the positive region. We have µ(−1) < 0, but it
increases when µ is more convex in the negative region. On the other hand, holding fixed
µ
′(0+) and the curvature µ′′(x) for x 6= 0, increasing the amount of loss aversion near 0 (i.e.,
µ
′(0−) − µ′(0+)) decreases µ(−1). So, the condition holds if µ exhibits enough diminishing
sensitivity, in the gains or losses domain, relative to the level of loss aversion. (It is easy to
show that if µ is instead two-part linear, then one-shot resolution is optimal.)
The quadratic news utility provides a clear illustration of Proposition 4’s condition as
a race between loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity: the condition holds if and only if
there is enough curvature relative to the size of the “kink” at 0.
Corollary 1. If the receiver has quadratic news utility with αn−αp < βn+βp, then one-shot
resolution is strictly suboptimal for any T .
The difference αn − αp ≥ is µ′(0−) − µ′(0+), which corresponds to the amount of loss
aversion in quadratic news utilities. On the other side, βp and βn control the amounts of
curvature in the positive and negative regions, respectively, and correspond to the extent of
diminishing sensitivity.
The sufficient condition in Proposition 4 is also satisfied by the most commonly used
model of diminishing sensitivity, the power function. One could think of the power func-
tion specification as having “infinite” diminishing sensitivity near 0, as µ′′(0+) = −∞ and
µ
′′(0−) =∞.
Corollary 2. Suppose µ(x) =
x
α if x ≥ 0
−λ · |x|β if x < 0
for some 0 < α, β < 1 and λ ≥ 1. Then
one-shot resolution is strictly suboptimal for any T .
While Proposition 4 holds generally, we can find sharper results on the sub-optimality
of one-shot resolution for specific news-utility models and environments. Kőszegi and Rabin
(2009)’s percentile-based news-utility model stipulates
N(pit | pit−1) =
∫ 1
0
µ
(
v(Fpit(p))− v(Fpit−1(p))
)
dp,
where Fpit(p) and Fpit−1(p) are the p-th percentile consumption levels according to beliefs pit
and pit−1, respectively. Whenever µ exhibits diminishing sensitivity to gains and there are
at least three states, one-shot resolution is strictly suboptimal. This result does not require
any assumption about loss aversion or diminishing sensitivity in losses.
15
Proposition 5. In Kőszegi and Rabin (2009)’s percentile-based news-utility model, provided
the gain-loss utility function µ satisfies µ′′(x) < 0 for all x > 0, one-shot resolution is strictly
suboptimal for any T and any K ≥ 3.
Similar to the idea behind Proposition 4, the proof of Proposition 5 constructs an infor-
mation structure to gradually deliver the good news that the state is the best one possible.
Proposition 5 requires at least three distinct consumption levels, K ≥ 3. In a binary-
states world, the percentile-based news-utility function N only depends on the value of µ at
two non-zero points. Thus every increasing µ is behaviorally indistinguishable from a two-
part linear one, meaning the percentile-based model cannot capture diminishing sensitivity
in a setting with binary states.
4.4 Gradual Good News and Gradual Bad News
For the remainder of the paper, we focus on mean-based news-utility functions to study
additional implications of diminishing sensitivity. Two classes of information structures will
play important roles in the sequel. To define them, we write vt := Eθ∼pit [v(cθ)] for the
expected future consumption utility based on the receiver’s (random) belief pit at the end of
period t. Partition states into two subsets, Θ = ΘB ∪ΘG, where v(cθ) < v0 for θ ∈ ΘB and
v(cθ) ≥ v0 for θ ∈ ΘG. Interpret ΘB as the “bad” states and ΘG as the “good” ones.
Definition 2. An information structure (M,σ) features gradual good news, one-shot bad
news if
• P(M,σ)[vt ≥ vt−1 for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T | θ ∈ ΘG] = 1 and
• P(M,σ)[vt < vt−1 for no more than one 1 ≤ t ≤ T | θ ∈ ΘB] = 1.
An information structure (M,σ) features gradual bad news, one-shot good news if
• P(M,σ)[vt ≤ vt−1 for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T | θ ∈ ΘB] = 1 and
• P(M,σ)[vt > vt−1 for no more than one 1 ≤ t ≤ T | θ ∈ ΘG] = 1.
In the first class of information structures (“gradual good news, one-shot bad news”), the
sender relays good news over time and gradually increases the receiver’s expectation of future
consumption. When the state is bad, the sender concentrates all the bad news in one period.
The “one-shot bad news” terminology comes from noting that when θ ∈ ΘB, the single
period t where vt < vt−1 must satisfy vt = v(cθ) and vt′ = vt for all t
′
> t. The receiver gets
negative information about his future consumption level for the first time in period t, and
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his expectation stays constant thereafter. On the other hand, we use the phrase “gradual
bad news, one-shot good news” to refer to the “opposite” kind of information structure.
One-shot resolution falls into both of these classes. To rule out this triviality, we say that
an information structure features strictly gradual good news if
P(M,σ)[vt > vt−1 and vt′ > vt′−1 for two distinct 1 ≤ t, t
′ ≤ T | θ ∈ ΘG] > 0.
That is, there is positive probability that the receiver’s expectation strictly increases at least
twice in periods 1 through T . Similarly define strictly gradual bad news.
We now prove that whenever µ satisfies diminishing sensitivity and (weak) loss aversion,
information structures featuring strictly gradual bad news, one-shot good news are strictly
worse than one-shot resolution. This conclusion also applies to symmetric µ with diminishing
sensitivity but not loss aversion, and holds for any state space Θ, horizon T, and prior pi0.
Proposition 6. Suppose µ satisfies diminishing sensitivity and weak loss aversion. Any
information structure featuring strictly gradual bad news, one-shot good news is strictly worse
than one-shot resolution in expectation, and almost surely weakly worse ex-post.
Proposition 6 identifies a class of information structures that are worse than one-shot
resolution for news utility with diminishing sensitivity, distinguishing it from other models of
information preference where one-shot resolution is the worst possible information structure.
Utility models that make this other prediction include suspense and surprise (Ely, Frankel,
and Kamenica, 2015) and news utility with a two-part linear, gain-loving (instead of loss-
averse) value function (Chapman, Snowberg, Wang, and Camerer, 2019; Goette, Graeber,
Kellogg, and Sprenger, 2020).
Under some additional restrictions, the optimal information structure exhibits strictly
gradual good news, one-shot bad news. For the rest of the paper, we specialize to the case
of K = 2. The next result presents a necessary and sufficient condition for inconclusive bad
news to be suboptimal when T = 2. We then verify the condition for quadratic news utility.
Proposition 7. For T = 2, information structures with P(M,σ)[pi1 < pi0 and pi1 6= 0] > 0
are strictly suboptimal if and only if there exists some q ≥ pi0 so that the chord connecting
(0, U1(0 | pi0)) and (q, U1(q | pi0)) lies strictly above U1(p | pi0) for all p ∈ (0, pi0).
Corollary 3. Quadratic news utility satisfies the condition of Proposition 7.
In particular, combining Corollaries 1 and 3, we infer that any optimal information
structure for a receiver with quadratic news utility satisfying αn − αp < βn + βp with T = 2
must feature strictly gradual good news, one-shot bad news. Furthermore, since there exists
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an optimal information structure with binary messages by Proposition 3, in this environment
there is an optimal information structure where the sender induces either belief 0 or belief
pH > pi0 in the only period of communication. The next subsection characterizes pH as a
function of the parameters of quadratic news utility.
In summary, we have established a ranking between three kinds of information structures
that point to a preference over the direction of news skewness. For any time horizon and
any state space, provided the condition in Proposition 4 holds and µ satisfies diminishing
sensitivity and weak loss aversion, some information structure featuring gradual good news,
one-shot bad news gives more news utility than one-shot resolution, which in turn gives more
news utility than any information structure featuring strictly gradual bad news, one-shot
good news. Further, under the additional restrictions in Proposition 7, a gradual good news,
one-shot bad news information structure is optimal among all information structures.
4.5 Explicit Solution with Quadratic News Utility
We illustrate Proposition 3’s concavification procedure by finding in closed-form the optimal
information structure when the receiver has a quadratic news-utility function.
Suppose the parameters of µ satisfy αn − αp < βn + βp in a T = 2 environment. From
the arguments in Section 4.4, there is an optimal information structure induces either pi1 = 0
or pi1 = pH for some pH > pi0. Proposition 3 implies (cavU1(· | pi0)) (x) > U1(x | pi0) for all
x ∈ (0, pH). The geometry of concavification shows the derivative of the value function at
pH , ∂∂xU1(x | pi0)(pH), equals the slope of the chord from 0 to pH on the function U1(· | pi0).
We use this equality to derive pH as the solution to a cubic polynomial.
Proposition 8. For T = 2 and quadratic news utility satisfying αn − αp < βn + βp, the
optimal partial good news pH > pi0 satisfies
pi0(αn − αp)− (βp + βn)pi20 = p2H(αn − αp + βn + βp)− p3H(2βp + 2βn).
Let c := αn−αp
βn+βp . We have
dpH
dc
> 0. Also, we have dpH
dpi0
< 0 when pi0 < 12c, and
dpH
dpi0
> 0 when
pi0 >
1
2c.
There is a tension between loss aversion near the reference point (captured by αn−αp) and
diminishing sensitivity (captured by βn + βp) in shaping the optimal information structure.
Fixing the prior belief, the optimal amount of partial good news is increasing in loss aversion
but decreasing in diminishing sensitivity. To understand these comparative statics, recall
that in the bad state the receiver will sometimes experience false hope as he gets interim
good news. The sender chooses between the receiver getting (i) a larger piece of false hope
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with lower probability, or (ii) a smaller piece of false hope with higher probability. When
there is more loss aversion near the reference point, belief paths that feature a small piece of
good news followed by a small piece of bad news become much more costly, so (i) is preferred.
When there is more diminishing sensitivity, the utility gap between the positive components
of (i) and (ii) narrows, so (ii) becomes more favorable.
The optimal partial good news is non-monotonic in the prior belief when µ exhibits loss
aversion — in that case, pH decreases with the prior when the prior is low, but increases
with the prior when it is high. Figure 3 illustrates. The intuition is that the sender faces
different incentives in maximizing the receiver’s news utility conditional on ω = G and
ω = B. Conditional on ω = G, the optimal interim good news is 12(1 + pi0), which exploits
diminishing sensitivity by splitting the good news evenly across two periods. Conditional
on ω = B, the distortion from loss aversion discussed before pushes the sender towards
sending a bigger piece of interim good news (with lower probability). For pi0 near 0, the
receiver’s expected welfare is essentially determined by his welfare in the bad state, so the
latter incentive dominates and pH is far above 0.5. As pi0 increases, the relative weight on
the good state’s welfare increases, so pH converges to 12(1 + pi0). In the case of αn = αp, the
distortion from loss aversion is absent, so we get dpH
dpi0
> 0 for any pi0 ∈ (0, 1).
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Figure 3: Left: Optimal partial good news with T = 2, prior pi0 = 0.1, quadratic news utility
parameters αp = 2, βp = 1, βn = 1, as a function of αn. The optimal pH monotonically
increases with the amount of loss aversion near 0. Right: Optimal partial good news with
T = 2, quadratic news utility parameters αp = 2, αn = 3, βp = 1, βn = 1, as a function
of the prior belief. The dashed blue line shows pi0 7→ 12(pi0 + 1), the midpoint between the
prior and 1. The optimal partial good news is decreasing in the prior before pi0 = 0.25, and
increasing afterwards.
5 Diminishing Sensitivity and the Credibility Problem
Section 4 studied the optimal disclosure of news when the sender has commitment power.
When the commitment assumption is dropped, some information structures that improve
on one-shot resolution cannot be implemented in the equilibrium of the cheap-talk game.
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If the sender wishes to gradually reveal the good state to a Bayesian receiver over multiple
periods, then she must also sometimes provide false hope in the bad state due to the cross-
state constraints on beliefs. But without commitment, the benevolent sender may strictly
prefer giving false hope over telling the truth in the bad state. This deviation improves
the total news utility of a receiver with diminishing sensitivity, if the positive utility from
today’s good news outweighs the additional future disappointment from higher expectations.
In fact, when news utility exhibits diminishing sensitivity and low enough loss aversion, the
above credibility problem is so severe that every equilibrium is payoff-equivalent to the bab-
bling equilibrium. This lack-of-commitment problem is a unique implication of diminishing
sensitivity — without it, the commitment solution and the equilibrium outcome coincide.
Sufficiently strong loss aversion can restore the equilibrium credibility of good-news mes-
sages. We show that the highest equilibrium payoff when the sender lacks commitment may
be non-monotonic in the extent of loss aversion, in contrast to the conclusion that more
loss-averse receivers are always strictly worse off when the sender has commitment power.
We also completely characterize the class of equilibria that feature (a deterministic sequence
of) gradual good news in the good state and study the equilibrium rate of learning. With the
quadratic or the square-root news-utility function, the sender always releases progressively
larger pieces of good news over time, so the receiver’s belief in the good state grows at an
increasing rate.
5.1 Equilibrium Analysis When the Sender Lacks Commitment
We continue to maintain that state space Θ = {G,B} is binary. To study the case where
the sender lacks commitment, we analyze the perfect-Bayesian equilibria of the cheap talk
game between the two parties. Formally, the equilibrium concept is as follows.
Definition 3. Let a finite set of messages M be fixed. A perfect-Bayesian equilibrium
consists of sender’s strategy σ∗ = (σ∗t )T−1t=1 together with receiver’s beliefs p∗ : ∪T−1t=0 H t →
[0, 1], where:
• For every 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1, ht−1 ∈ H t−1 and θ ∈ {G,B}, σ∗ maximizes the receiver’s
total expected news utility in periods t, ..., T − 1, T conditional on having reached the
public history ht−1 in state θ at the start of period t.
• p∗ is derived by applying the Bayes’ rule to σ∗ whenever possible.
We make two belief-refinement restrictions:
• If t ≤ T−1, ht is a continuation history of ht, and p∗(ht) ∈ {0, 1}, then p∗(ht) = p∗(ht).
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• The receiver’s belief in period T when state is θ satisfies piT = 1θ, regardless of the
preceding history hT−1 ∈ HT−1.
We will abbreviate a perfect-Bayesian equilibrium satisfying our belief refinements as an
“equilibrium.” Our definition requires that once the receiver updates his belief to 0 or 1, this
belief stays constant through the end of period T − 1. In other words, the support of his
belief is non-expanding through the penultimate period.7 In period T, the receiver updates
his belief to reflect full confidence in the true state of the world, regardless of his (possibly
dogmatically wrong) belief at the end of period T − 1.
The receiver derives news utility in periods 1 ≤ t ≤ T based on changes in his belief, as
in the model with commitment. The sender is benevolent, with the total news utility of the
receiver as her objective. This implies the sender expects different equilibrium payoffs from
sending the same sequence of messages in different states, as the state determines piT and
hence the receiver’s news utility in the final period.8
Let Vµ,M,T (pi0) ⊆ R denote the set of equilibrium payoffs with news-utility function µ,
message space M, time horizon T, and prior pi0. Clearly, Vµ,M,T (pi0) is non-empty. There is
always the babbling equilibrium, where the sender mixes over all messages uniformly in both
states and the receiver’s belief never updates from the prior belief until period T . Denote
the babbling equilibrium payoff by
V Babµ (pi0) := pi0µ(1− pi0) + (1− pi0)µ(−pi0)
and note it is independent of M and T.
We state two preliminary properties of the equilibrium payoffs set Vµ,M,T (pi0).
Lemma 1. We have:
1. For any finite M, Vµ,M,T (pi0) ⊆ Vµ,{g,b},T (pi0)
2. If T ≤ T ′ , then Vµ,M,T (pi0) ⊆ Vµ,M,T ′ (pi0).
The first statement says any equilibrium payoff achievable with an arbitrary finite message
space is also achievable with a binary message space. The second statement says the set of
equilibrium payoffs weakly expands with the time horizon.
7This standard refinement was first used in Grossman and Perry (1986). It rules out pathological off-path
belief updates if the sender deviates and sends a message perfectly indicative of one state following a history
where the receiver is fully convinced of the other state.
8In particular, this is not a cheap-talk game with state-independent sender payoffs, as in Lipnowski and
Ravid (2020).
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5.2 The Credibility Problem and Babbling
To understand the source of the credibility problem, let NB(x; pi) := µ(x − pi) + µ(−x)
denote the total amount of news utility across two periods when the receiver updates his
belief from pi to x > pi today and updates it from x to 0 tomorrow. Suppose there exists
a period T − 2 public history hT−2 ∈ HT−2 with p∗(hT−2) = pi and some x > pi satisfying
NB(x; pi) > NB(0;pi). Then, the sender strictly prefers to induce belief x rather than belief 0
after arriving at the history hT−2 in the bad state. A good-news message mx inducing belief
x and a bad-news message m0 inducing belief 0 cannot both be on-path following hT−2, else
the sender would strictly prefer to send mx with probability 1 in the bad state.
Yet, the inequality NB(0;pi) < NB(x; pi) automatically holds for any x > pi, provided µ
is strictly concave in the positive region and symmetric around 0.
Lemma 2. If µ is symmetric around 0 and µ′′(x) < 0 for all x > 0, then for any 0 < pi <
x < 1 it holds NB(0; pi) < NB(x; pi).
The intuition is that when the state is bad, the sender knows the receiver will inevitably
get conclusive bad news in period T. Giving false hope in period T − 1 (i.e., inducing belief
x > pi instead of 0) provides positive news utility at the cost of greater disappointment
in the final period. Diminishing sensitivity limits the incremental cost of this additional
disappointment.
The credibility problem implies that the babbling payoff is the unique equilibrium payoff.
Proposition 9. Suppose µ is symmetric around 0 and µ′′(x) < 0 for all x > 0. For any
M,T, pi0, the only equilibrium payoff is the babbling payoff, Vµ,M,T (pi0) = {V Babµ (pi0)}.
The babbling equilibrium is unique up to payoffs, even though the players share the same
payoff function. In a cheap-talk setting with instrumental information and anticipatory util-
ity, Kőszegi (2006) shows that a benevolent sender also distorts equilibrium communication
relative to the commitment benchmark. The breakdown in communication is more complete
in our setting, for the players get the same payoffs as when communication is impossible.
To understand why communication fails despite an apparent lack of conflicting interests,
observe that the interaction has the same set of equilibria as the following non-psychological
auxiliary game: in every period t ≥ 0, the receiver plays some action at ∈ [0, 1]. At the end
of the game, the receiver gets ∑Tt=0−(at− 1{θ=G})2 — that is, the receiver is incentivized to
play the action that corresponds to the Bayesian probability of the state being good in every
period, and gets no other sources of payoffs. The sender gets utility µ(at − at−1) in period
t ≥ 1. In this equivalent model where the receiver takes actions, we see that the players
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have different objective functions over these actions, so we should expect some distortion of
communication in all equilibria.
We now explore what happens when µ is asymmetric around 0 due to loss aversion. Say
µ exhibits greater sensitivity to losses if µ′(x) ≤ µ′(−x) for all x > 0. We first establish
a robustness check to Proposition 9 within this class of news-utility functions: when loss
aversion is sufficiently weak relative to diminishing sensitivity in a T = 2 model, the babbling
equilibrium remains unique up to payoffs.
Proposition 10. Suppose µ exhibits greater sensitivity to losses. If minz∈[0,1−pi0]
µ
′ (z)
µ′ (−(pi0+z)) >
1, then Vµ,M,2(pi0) = {V Babµ (pi0)} for any M.
When µ is symmetric and does not exhibit strict loss aversion, diminishing sensitivity
implies µ′(−(pi0 + z)) = µ′(pi0 + z) < µ′(z) for every z ∈ [0, 1 − pi0], so the inequality
condition in Proposition 10 is always satisfied. This condition continues to hold if µ is
slightly asymmetric due to a “small enough” amount of loss aversion relative to the size
of the sensitivity gap µ′(z) − µ′(pi0 + z). This interpretation is clearest for the λ-scaled
news-utility functions, as formalized in the following corollary.
Corollary 4. Suppose for some µ˜pos : [0, 1]→ R+ and λ ≥ 1, the news-utility function µ sat-
isfies µ(x) = µ˜pos(x), µ(−x) = −λµ˜pos(x) for all x ≥ 0. Provided λ < minz∈[0,1−pi0] µ˜
′
pos(z)
µ˜′pos(pi0+z)
,
Vµ,M,2(pi0) = {V Babµ (pi0)} for any M.
When µ is strictly concave in the positive region, Corollary 4 gives a non-degenerate
interval of loss-aversion parameters for which the conclusion of Proposition 9 extends in a
T = 2 setting. If µ˜pos contains more curvature, then µ˜
′
pos(z)/µ˜
′
pos(pi0 + z) becomes larger and
the interval of permissible λ’s expands.
What happens when loss aversion is high? The next proposition says a new equilibrium
that payoff-dominates the babbling one exists for large λ, provided the marginal utility of an
infinitesimally small piece of good news is infinite — as in the power-function specification.
Proposition 11. Fix µ˜pos : [0, 1] → R+ strictly increasing and concave, continuously dif-
ferentiable at x > 0, µ˜pos(0) = 0, and limx→0 µ˜
′
pos(x) = ∞. Consider the family λ-indexed
news-utility functions µ(x) = µ˜pos(x), µ(−x) = −λµ˜pos(x) for x ≥ 0. For each pi0 ∈ (0, 1),
there exists λ¯ ≥ 1 so that whenever λ ≥ λ¯ and for any T ≥ 2, |M | ≥ 2, there exists
V ∈ Vµ,M,T (pi0) with V > V Babµ (pi0).
To help illustrate these results, suppose µ(x) =
√
x for x ≥ 0, µ(x) = −λ√−x for x < 0,
T = 2, and pi0 = 12 . Corollary 4 implies whenever λ <
√
2, the babbling equilibrium is unique
up to payoffs. On the other hand, Proposition 11 says when λ is sufficiently high, there is
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Figure 4: The babbling equilibrium is essentially unique for low values of λ, but there exists
an equilibrium with gradual good news for λ ≥ 2.414. Due to the role of loss aversion in
sustaining credible partial news, a receiver with higher loss aversion may experience higher
or lower expected news utility in equilibrium than a receiver with lower loss aversion.
another equilibrium with strictly higher payoffs. In fact, a non-babbling equilibrium first
appears when λ = 2.414. Figure 4 plots the highest equilibrium payoff for different values of
λ. Receivers with higher λ may enjoy higher equilibrium payoffs. The reason for this non-
monotonicity is that for low values of λ, the babbling equilibrium is unique and increasing λ
decreases expected news utility linearly. When the new, non-babbling equilibrium emerges
for large enough λ, the sender’s behavior in the new equilibrium depends on λ. Higher
loss aversion carries two countervailing effects: first, a non-strategic effect of hurting welfare
when θ = B, as the receiver must eventually hear the bad news; second, an equilibrium effect
of changing the relative amounts of good news in different periods conditional on θ = G.
Receivers with an intermediate amount of loss aversion enjoy higher expected news utility
than receivers with low loss aversion, as the equilibrium effect leads to better “consumption
smoothing” of good news across time. But, the non-strategic effect eventually dominates
and receivers with high loss aversion experience worse payoffs than receivers with low loss
aversion.
5.3 Deterministic Gradual Good News Equilibria
An equilibrium (M,σ∗, p∗) features deterministic9gradual good news (GGN equilibrium) if
there exist a sequence of constants p0 ≤ p1 ≤ ... ≤ pT−1 ≤ pT with p0 = pi0, pT = 1, and the
receiver always has belief pt in period t when the state is good. By Bayesian beliefs, in the
9This class of equilibria is slightly more restrictive than the gradual good news, one-shot bad news
information structures from Definition 2, because the sender may not randomize between several increasing
paths of beliefs in the good state.
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bad state of any GGN equilibrium the sender must induce a belief of either 0 or pt in period
t, as any message not inducing belief pt is a conclusive signal of the bad state.
The class of GGN equilibria is non-empty, for it contains the babbling equilibrium where
pi0 = p0 = p1 = ... = pT−1 < pT = 1. The number of intermediate beliefs in a GGN
equilibrium is the number of distinct beliefs in the open interval (pi0, 1) along the sequence
p0, p1, ..., pT−1. The babbling equilibrium has zero intermediate beliefs.
The next proposition characterizes the set of all GGN equilibria with at least one inter-
mediate belief.
Proposition 12. Let P ∗(pi) ⊆ (pi, 1] be those beliefs x satisfying NB(x; pi) = NB(0; pi).
Suppose µ exhibits diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion. For 1 ≤ J ≤ T −1, there exists
a gradual good news equilibrium with the J intermediate beliefs q(1) < ... < q(J) if and only
if q(j) ∈ P ∗(q(j−1)) for every j = 1, ..., J , where q(0) := pi0.
To interpret, P ∗(pi) contains the set of beliefs x > pi such that the sender is indifferent
between inducing the two belief paths pi → x → 0 and pi → 0. Recall that when µ is
symmetric, Lemma 2 implies this indifference condition is never satisfied, which is the source
of the credibility problem for good-news messages. The same indifference condition pins down
the relationship between successive intermediate beliefs in GGN equilibria.
We illustrate this result with the quadratic news utility.
Corollary 5. 1) With quadratic news utility, P ∗(pi) =
{
pi · βp+βn
βp−βn −
αn−αp
βp−βn
}
∩ (pi, 1).
2a) If βn > βp, there cannot exist any gradual good news equilibrium with more than one
intermediate belief.
2b) If βn < βp, there can exist gradual good news equilibria with more than one interme-
diate belief. For a given set of parameters of the quadratic news-utility function and prior
pi0, there exists a uniform bound on the number of intermediate beliefs that can be sustained
in equilibrium across all T .
3) In any GGN equilibrium with quadratic news utility, intermediate beliefs in the good
state grow at an increasing rate.
Combined with Proposition 12, part 1) of this corollary says that in every GGN equilib-
rium, the successive intermediate beliefs are related by the linear map x 7→ x · βp+βn
βp−βn −
αn−αp
βp−βn .
When βn > βp, this map has a negative slope, so there cannot exist any GGN equilibrium
with more than one intermediate belief. When βp > βn, this map has a slope strictly larger
than 1. As a result, after eliminating periods where no informative signal is released, ev-
ery GGN equilibrium releases progressively larger pieces of good news in the good state,
q(j+1) − q(j) > q(j) − q(j−1). Since equilibrium beliefs in the good state grow at an increasing
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Figure 5: The longest possible sequence of GGN intermediate beliefs starting with prior
pi0 = 13 . For quadratic news utility, equilibrium GGN beliefs always increase at an increasing
rate in the good state.
rate, there exists some uniform bound J¯ on the number of intermediate beliefs depending
only on the prior belief pi0 and parameters of the news-utility function.
As an illustration, consider the quadratic news utility with αp = 2, αn = 2.1, βp = 1, and
βn = 0.2. Starting at the prior belief of pi0 = 13 , Figure 5 shows the longest possible sequence
of intermediate beliefs in any GGN equilibrium for arbitrarily large T . Since the P ∗ sets are
either empty sets or singleton sets for the quadratic news utility, Figure 5 also contains all
the possible beliefs in any state of any GGN equilibrium with these parameters.
The result that GGN equilibria release increasingly larger pieces of good news generalizes
to other news-utility functions with diminishing sensitivity. The basic intuition is that if
the sender is indifferent between providing d amount of false hope and truth-telling in the
bad state when the receiver has prior belief piL (i.e., piL + d ∈ P ∗(piL)), then she strictly
prefers providing the same amount of false hope over truth-telling at any more optimistic
prior belief piH > piL. The false hope generates the same positive news utility in both cases,
but an extra d units of disappointment matters less when added a baseline disappointment
level of piH rather than piL, thanks to diminishing sensitivity.
The next proposition formalizes this idea. It shows that when diminishing sensitivity is
combined with a pair of regularity conditions, intermediate beliefs grow at an increasing
rate in any GGN equilibrium.
Proposition 13. Suppose µ exhibits diminishing sensitivity, |P ∗(pi)| ≤ 1 and ∂
∂x
NB(x; pi)|x=pi >
0 for all pi ∈ (0, 1). Then, in any GGN equilibrium with intermediate beliefs q(1) < ... < q(J),
we get q(j) − q(j−1) < q(j+1) − q(j) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ J − 1.
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The first regularity condition requires that the sender is indifferent between the belief paths
pi → x→ 0 and pi → 0 for at most one x > pi. It is a technical assumption that lets us prove
our result, but we suspect the conclusion also holds under some relaxed conditions. The
second regularity condition says in the bad state, the total news utility associated with an 
amount of false hope is higher than truth-telling for small . These conditions are satisfied
by the power-function news utility with α = β, for example.
Corollary 6. In any GGN equilibrium with power-function news utility with α = β and any
λ ≥ 1, intermediate beliefs in the good state grow at an increasing rate.
6 Related Literature and Predictions of Other Belief-
Based Utility Models
6.1 Related Work on New Utility
Since Kőszegi and Rabin (2009), several other authors have analyzed the implications of
news utility in different settings: asset pricing (Pagel, 2016), life-cycle consumption (Pagel,
2017), portfolio choice (Pagel, 2018), and mechanism design (Duraj, 2019). These papers
focus on Bayesian agents with two-part linear gain-loss utilities and do not study the role of
diminishing sensitivity to news.
Our model of diminishing sensitivity over the magnitude of news shares the same psy-
chological motivation as Kahneman and Tversky (1979), who base their theory of human
responses to monetary gains and losses on Weber’s law and psychological experiments about
human responses to changes in physical attributes like temperature or brightness. Interpret-
ing monetary gains and losses as news about future consumption, experiments that show
risk-seeking behavior when choosing between loss lotteries and risk-averse behavior when
choosing between gain lotteries provide evidence for diminishing sensitivity over consump-
tion news (see e.g., Rabin and Weizsäcker (2009)). In the same vein, papers in the finance
literature that use diminishing sensitivity over monetary gains and losses to explain the dis-
position effect (Shefrin and Statman, 1985; Kyle, Ou-Yang, and Xiong, 2006; Barberis and
Xiong, 2012; Henderson, 2012) also provide indirect evidence for diminishing sensitivity over
consumption news.
We are not aware of existing work that focuses on how diminishing sensitivity mat-
ters for information design with news utility. In fact, except for the work on disposition
effect in finance, very few papers deal with diminishing sensitivity in any kind of reference-
dependent preference. One exception is Bowman, Minehart, and Rabin (1999), who study
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a consumption-based reference-dependent model with diminishing sensitivity. A critical dif-
ference is that their reference points are based on past habits, not rational expectations.
In their environment, a consumer who knows their future income optimally concentrates all
consumption losses in the first period if income will be low, but spreads out consumption
gains across multiple periods if income will be high. As discussed in Remark 1, the analog
of this strategy cannot be implemented in our setting since the receiver derives news utility
from changes in rational Bayesian beliefs.
While some of our results apply to Kőszegi and Rabin (2009)’s model of news utility
or to a more general class of such models (e.g., Proposition 3, Proposition 4, Proposition
5), we mostly focus on the simplest model of news utility where the agent derives gain-loss
utility from changes in expected future consumption utility. This mean-based model lets
us concentrate on the implications of diminishing sensitivity, but differs from Kőszegi and
Rabin (2009)’s model where agents make a percentile-by-percentile comparison between old
and new beliefs. Fully characterizing the optimal information structure using this percentile-
based model is out of reach for us, but our numerical simulations in Online Appendix OA
3.2.2 suggest the answers would be very similar.
6.2 Predictions of Other Belief-Based Utility Models
In general, papers on belief-based utility have highlighted two sources of felicity: levels of
belief about future consumption utility (“anticipatory utility,” e.g., Kőszegi (2006); Eliaz and
Spiegler (2006); Schweizer and Szech (2018)) and changes in belief about future consumption
utility (“news utility” and “suspense and surprise” (Ely, Frankel, and Kamenica, 2015)). For
the latter, some function of both the prior belief and the posterior belief serves as the carrier
of utility, while a given posterior belief brings the same anticipatory utility for all priors
(Eliaz and Spiegler, 2006). The rich dynamics of the optimal information structure under
news utility with diminishing sensitivity contrast against more stark predictions of the other
commonly used models of belief-based utility in the behavioral literature.
6.2.1 News Utility without Diminishing Sensitivity
The literature on reference-dependent preferences and news utility has focused on two-part
linear gain-loss utility functions, which violate diminishing sensitivity. If µ is two-part linear
with loss aversion, then it follows from the martingale property of Bayesian beliefs that one-
shot resolution is weakly optimal for the sender among all information structures. If there
is strict loss aversion, then one-shot resolution does strictly better than any information
structure that resolves uncertainty gradually. As our results have shown, more nuanced
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information structures emerge as optimal when the receiver exhibits diminishing sensitivity.
6.2.2 Anticipatory Utility
In our setup, a receiver who experiences anticipatory utility gets A (∑θ∈Θ pit(θ) · v(cθ)) if she
ends period t with posterior belief pit ∈ ∆(Θ), where A : R → R is a strictly increasing
anticipatory-utility function. When A is the identity function (as in Kőszegi (2006)), the
solution to the sender’s problem would be unchanged if we modified our model and let
the receiver experience both anticipatory utility and news utility. This is because by the
martingale property, the receiver’s ex-ante expected anticipatory utility in a given period is
the same across all information structures. So, the ranking of information structures entirely
depends on the news utility they generate.
For a general A, if the receiver only experiences anticipatory utility, not news utility,
then the sender has an optimal information structure that only releases information in t = 1,
followed by uninformative babbling in all subsequent periods (see Online Appendix OA 4.1).
The rich dynamics of the optimal information structure in our news-utility model are thus
absent in an anticipatory-utility model.
6.2.3 Suspense and Surprise
Ely, Frankel, and Kamenica (2015) study dynamic information design with a Bayesian re-
ceiver who derives utility from suspense or surprise. They propose and study an original
utility function over belief paths where larger belief movements always bring greater felic-
ity. By contrast, because our states are associated with different consumption consequences,
changes in beliefs may increase or decrease the receiver’s utility depending on whether the
news is good or bad. While one-shot resolution is suboptimal in both Ely, Frankel, and
Kamenica (2015)’s problem and our problem (under some conditions), the optimal informa-
tion structure differs. The optimal information structure in our problem is asymmetric, a
key implication of diminishing sensitivity. Another difference is that information structures
featuring gradual bad news, one-shot good news are worse than one-shot resolution in our
problem, while one-shot resolution is the worst possible information structure in Ely, Frankel,
and Kamenica (2015)’s problem.
Ely, Frankel, and Kamenica (2015) also discuss state-dependent versions of suspense and
surprise utilities, but this extension does not embed our model. Suppose there are two states,
Θ = {G,B}, and the agent has the suspense objective ∑T−1t=0 u (Et(∑θ αθ · (pit+1(θ)− pit(θ))2)
or the surprise objective ∑Tt=1 u (∑θ αθ · (pit(θ)− pit−1(θ))2), where αG, αB > 0 are state-
dependent scaling weights. We must have pit+1(G)−pit(G) = −(pit+1(B)−pit(B)), so pathwise
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(pit+1(G) − pit(G))2 = (pit+1(B) − pit(B))2. This shows that the new objectives obtained by
applying two possibly different scaling weights αG 6= αB to states G and B are identical to the
ones that would be obtained by applying the same scaling weight α = αG+αB2 to both states.
Due to this symmetry in preference, the optimal information structure for entertaining an
agent with state-dependent suspense or surprise utility treats the two states symmetrically,
in contrast to a central prediction of diminishing sensitivity in our model.
6.2.4 Designing Beliefs through Non-Informational Channels
Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) and Macera (2014) study the optimal design of beliefs for
agents with belief-based utilities that differ from the news-utility setup we consider. Another
important distinction is that we focus on the design of information: changes in the receiver’s
belief derive from Bayesian updating an exogenous prior, using the information conveyed
by the sender. Macera (2014) considers a non-Bayesian agent who freely chooses a path
of beliefs, while knowing the actual state of the world. Brunnermeier and Parker (2005)
study the “opposite” problem to ours, where the agent freely chooses a prior belief (over
the sequence of state realizations) at the start of the game, then updates belief about future
states through an exogenously given information structure.
6.3 Related Decision-Theoretic Work on Information Preference
Several paper in decision theory have studied models of preference over dynamic information
structures. Dillenberger (2010) shows that preference for one-shot resolution of uncertainty
is equivalent to a weakened version of independence, provided the preference satisfies re-
cursivity. This result does not apply here because our mean-based model of news utility
violates recursivity — it can be shown that a news-utility agent may strictly prefer a 0%
chance of winning a prize over a 1% chance of winning it, if he will gradually learn about
the outcome of the lottery and has high enough loss aversion (see Online Appendix OA
3.1).10 Dillenberger and Raymond (2020) axiomatize a general class of additive belief-based
preferences in the domain of two-stage lotteries, relaxing recursivity and the independence
axiom. In the case of T = 2, our news-utility model belongs to the class they characterize.
Under this specialization, our work may be thought of as studying the information design
problem, with and without commitment, using some of Dillenberger and Raymond (2020)’s
additive belief-based preferences. Dillenberger and Raymond (2020) also provide high-level
conditions for additive belief-based preferences to exhibit preference for one-shot resolution.
10Dreyfuss, Heffetz, and Rabin (2019) show that the percentile-based news-utility model can also predict
preference over dominated lotteries. They use this result to explain the empirical evidence of people making
dominated choices in strategy-proof mechanisms.
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We are able to find more interpretable and easy-to-verify conditions for the sub-optimality
of one-shot resolution, working with a specific sub-class of their preferences. Gul, Natenzon,
and Pesendorfer (2019) axiomatize a class of preferences over non-instrumental information
called risk consumption preferences, including a novel “peak-trough” utility specification. In
contrast, we study the implications diminishing sensitivity, a classical assumption from the
behavioral economics literature. Our model is not a risk consumption preference (see Online
Appendix OA 4.2). Finally, our work differs from the strand of decision theory literature
in that we also study a cheap-talk game with an informed sender who lacks commitment
power.
6.4 Related Work in Dynamic Information Design
In a setting without behavioral preferences, Li and Norman (2021) and Wu (2018) consider
a group of senders with commitment power, sequentially sending signals to persuade a single
receiver. The receiver takes an action after observing all signals. This action, together with
the true state of the world, determines the payoffs of every player. While these authors
study a dynamic environment, only the final belief of the receiver at the end of the last
period matters for payoffs. Indeed, every equilibrium in their setting can be converted into a
payoff-equivalent “one-step” equilibrium where the first sender sends the joint signal implied
by the old equilibrium, while all subsequent senders babble uninformatively. In our setting,
the distribution of the receiver’s final belief is already pinned down by the prior belief at
the start of the first period. Yet, different sequences of interim beliefs cause the receiver to
experience different amounts of total news utility. The stochastic process of these interim
beliefs constitutes the object of design. We provide a general procedure for computing the
optimal dynamic information structure in this new setting.
Lipnowski and Mathevet (2018) study a static model of information design with a psy-
chological receiver whose welfare depends directly on posterior belief. They discuss an appli-
cation to a mean-based news-utility model without diminishing sensitivity in their Appendix
A, finding that either one-shot resolution or no information is optimal. We focus on the
implications of diminishing sensitivity and derive specific characterizations of the optimal
information structure. Our work also differs in that we study a dynamic problem and exam-
ine equilibria without commitment.
6.5 Experiments on Information Preference
A number of experimental papers have tested whether people prefer one-shot resolution by
asking subjects to choose how they wish to learn about their prize for the experiment, with
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one-shot information as a feasible information structure. The empirical results are mixed.
After accounting for preference over the timing of resolution,11 Falk and Zimmermann (2017)
and Bellemare, Krause, Kröger, and Zhang (2005) find evidence that subjects prefer one-shot
resolution, while Nielsen (2020); Masatlioglu, Orhun, and Raymond (2017); Zimmermann
(2014); Budescu and Fischer (2001) find evidence against it. News utility with diminishing
sensitivity may explain these mixed results, as it predicts one-shot resolution is neither the
best nor the worst information structure, so it may or may not be chosen depending on what
other information structures are feasible in a particular experiment. On the other hand,
these experimental results are harder to reconcile with theories that either predict agents
always choose one-shot resolution or predict agents always avoid it.
Two experiments have examined people’s preference over the skewness of news, with
mixed results. Tables 10 and 11 in Nielsen (2020) report that subjects prefer negatively
skewed news, as predicted by news utility with diminishing sensitivity. But, Masatlioglu,
Orhun, and Raymond (2017) find that agents prefer positively skewed news. In showing that
a classical assumption of reference dependence leads to a prediction about preference over
news skewness, we hope to stimulate further empirical work on this topic.
In the concluding discussion below, we propose an experimental test of news utility with
diminishing sensitivity, based on Proposition 1’s prediction about within-subject variations
in the preference for one-shot resolution across treatments that associate prizes to states of
the world in different ways.
7 Concluding Discussion
In this work, we have studied how an informed sender optimally communicates with a receiver
who derives diminishingly sensitive gain-loss utilities from changes in beliefs. If we think that
diminishing sensitivity to the magnitude of news is psychologically realistic in this domain,
then the stark predictions of the ubiquitous two-part linear models may be misleading. In
the presence of diminishing sensitivity, richer informational preferences emerge.
An agent’s consumption preference over the states can determine his preference between
an information structure that delivers news gradually and another that results in one-shot
resolution. When all information structures are feasible, one-shot resolution is neither the
best one nor the worst one — skewness matters. One-shot resolution is strictly better
than information structures with strictly gradual bad news, one-shot good news. But, it
11Information structures that reveal the prize gradually will resolve uncertainty earlier than a one-shot in-
formation structure that reveals the prize at the end of the experiment, but later than a one-shot information
structure that reveals the prize immediately.
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is strictly worse than the optimal information structure, which is asymmetric and features
strictly gradual good news, one-shot bad news (under the conditions we identified).
If the sender lacks commitment power, diminishing sensitivity leads to novel credibility
problems that inhibit any meaningful communication when the receiver has no loss aversion.
High enough loss aversion can restore the equilibrium credibility of good-news messages, and
the receiver’s equilibrium welfare may be non-monotonic in loss aversion. We construct a
family of non-babbling equilibria when loss aversion is high enough, finding that the sender
must communicate increasingly larger pieces of good news over time in the good state.
We have considered news utility as a subclass of reference-dependent preferences, ex-
ploring the implications of diminishing sensitivity for informational preference. We have
abstracted away from probability weighting, another aspect of prospect theory that is some-
times applied together with reference dependence. This is partly to focus on the under-
explored assumption of diminishing sensitivity, and partly because probability weighting
seems to face more foundational issues than the reference-dependent aspect of prospect the-
ory. In Kahneman and Tversky (1979)’s original formulation of nonlinear probability weight-
ing, breaking up a positive outcome into two equally likely positive outcomes that slightly
differ from each other leads to a discontinuous increase in the utility of the prospect, and
can thus generate a violation of first-order stochastic dominance. On the other hand, Quig-
gin (1982)’s rank-dependent probability weighting has met recent experimental challenges
(Bernheim and Sprenger, 2020).
Some of our predictions can empirically distinguish news utility with diminishing sensitiv-
ity from other models of belief-based preference over non-instrumental information, including
the two-part linear news-utility model. Proposition 1, for example, suggests a laboratory
experiment where a sequence of binary events determines whether a baseline state or an
alternative state realizes, with the alternative state happening if and only if all of the binary
events are “successful.” Consider two treatments that have the same success probabilities for
the binary events, but differ in terms of whether subjects get a better prize or a worse prize
in the alternative state compared with the baseline state. In each treatment, the experiment
asks whether each subject wishes to gradually learn about the intermediate binary events
or only learn about the final state, and elicits the subject’s willingness to pay to experience
their preferred information structure rather than the other one. Diminishing sensitivity over
news predicts that subjects should have a higher willingness-to-pay for one-shot resolution
when consumption is lower in the alternative state than when it is higher in the alternative
state, a hypothesis we plan to test in future work.
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Appendix
The Online Appendix may be accessed at: https://kevinhe.net/papers/ds_oa.pdf
A Proofs of the Main Results
In the proofs, we will often use the following fact about news-utility functions with dimin-
ishing sensitivity. We omit its simple proof.
Fact 1. Let d1, d2 > 0 and suppose µ(0) = 0.
• (sub-additivity in gains) If µ′′(x) < 0 for all x > 0, then µ(d1 + d2) < µ(d1) + µ(d2).
• (super-additivity in losses) If µ′′(x) > 0 for all x < 0, then µ(−d1 − d2) > µ(−d1) +
µ(−d2)
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Consider an agent who prefers B over A. In state A, he gets µ(−ρ0) with one-shot
information, but ∑Tt=1 µ(ρt − ρt−1) with gradual information. For each t, ρt − ρt−1 < 0, and
furthermore∑Tt=1 ρt−ρt−1 = −ρ0 by telescoping and using the fact that ρT = 0. Due to super-
additivity in losses, we get that µ(−ρ0) > ∑Tt=1 µ(ρt−ρt−1). In state B, he gets µ(1−ρ0) with
one-shot information. With gradual information, let Tˆ ≤ T be the first period where the coin
toss comes up tails. His news utility is
[∑Tˆ−1
t=1 µ(ρt − ρt−1)
]
+µ(1−ρTˆ−1) where each ρt−ρt−1 <
0 for 1 ≤ t ≤ Tˆ−1. Again by super-additivity in losses, ∑Tˆ−1t=1 µ(ρt−ρt−1) < µ(ρTˆ−1−ρ0). By
sub-additivity in gains, µ(1− ρTˆ−1) < µ(ρ0− ρTˆ−1) +µ(1− ρ0) ≤ −µ(ρTˆ−1− ρ0) +µ(1− ρ0),
where the weak inequality follows since λ ≥ 1. Putting these pieces together,
Tˆ−1∑
t=1
µ(ρt − ρt−1)
+ µ(1− ρTˆ−1) < µ(ρTˆ−1 − ρ0)− µ(ρTˆ−1 − ρ0) + µ(1− ρ0) = µ(1− ρ0)
as desired.
Now consider an agent who prefers A over B. We show that when λ = 1, the agent strictly
prefers gradual information to one-shot information. By continuity of news utility in λ, the
same strict preference must also hold for λ in an open neighborhood around 1.
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In state A, the agent gets µ(1 − pi0) with one-shot information, but ∑Tt=1 µ(pit − pit−1)
with gradual information. For each t, pit−pit−1 > 0, and furthermore ∑Tt=1 pit−pit−1 = 1−pi0
by telescoping and using the fact that piT = 1. Due to sub-additivity in gains, we get that∑T
t=1 µ(pit − pit−1) > µ(1− pi0). In state B, he gets µ(−pi0) with one-shot information. With
gradual information, let Tˆ ≤ T be the first period where the XTˆ = 0. His news utility is[∑Tˆ−1
t=1 µ(pit − pit−1)
]
+ µ(−piTˆ−1) where each pit − pit−1 > 0 for 1 ≤ t ≤ Tˆ − 1. Again by
sub-additivity in gains, ∑Tˆ−1t=1 µ(pit − pit−1) > µ(piTˆ−1 − pi0). By super-additivity in losses,
µ(−piTˆ−1) > µ(−(piTˆ−1−pi0))+µ(−pi0) = −µ(piTˆ−1−pi0)+µ(−pi0), where the equality comes
from the fact that λ = 1 so µ is symmetric about 0. Putting these pieces together,
Tˆ−1∑
t=1
µ(pit − pit−1)
+ µ(−piTˆ−1) > µ(piTˆ−1 − pi0)− µ(piTˆ−1 − pi0) + µ(−pi0) = µ(−pi0)
as desired.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Suppose T = 2. Consider the following family of information structures, indexed
by  > 0. Order the states based on Ec∼Fθ [v(c)] and label them θL, θ2, ..., θK−1, θH . Let
M = {mL,m2, ...,mK−1,mH}. Let σt(θk)(mk) = 1 for 2 ≤ k ≤ K − 1, σt(θH)(mH) = 1, and
σt(θL)(mL) = x, σt(θL)(mH) = 1 − x for some x ∈ (0, 1) so that the posterior belief after
observing mH is (1− )1H ⊕ 1L.
For every  > 0, the information structure just described leads to one-shot resolution of
states θ /∈ {θL, θH}. The difference between its expected news utility and that of one-shot
resolution is W (), given by
pi0(θH) · [N((1− )1H ⊕ 1L | pi0) +N(1H | (1− )1H ⊕ 1L)−N(1H | pi0)]
+ 1− pi0(θH) · [N((1− )1H ⊕ 1L | pi0) +N(1L | (1− )1H ⊕ 1L)−N(1L | pi0)] .
W is continuously differentiable away from 0 and W (0) = 0. To show that W () > 0 for
some  > 0, it suffices that lim→0+ W
′() > 0. Using the continuous differentiability of N
except when its two arguments are identical, this limit is
lim
→0+
N((1− )1H ⊕ 1L | pi0)−N(1H | pi0)

+ lim
→0+
N(1H | (1− )1H ⊕ 1L)

+N(1H | pi0) +N(1L | 1H)−N(1L | pi0).
Simple rearrangement gives the expression from Proposition 4. The expression for the case
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of mean-based µ follows by algebra, noting that N((1− x)1H ⊕ x1L | pi0) = µ((1− x)− v0)
for x ∈ [0, 1].
If T > 2, then note the sender’s T -period problem starting with prior pi0 has a value at
least as large as the 2-period problem with the same prior. On the other hand, one-shot
resolution brings the same total expected news utility regardless of T.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. We show that one-shot resolution gives weakly higher news utility conditional on each
state, and strictly higher news utility conditional on at least one θ ∈ ΘB.
When θ ∈ ΘB, P(M,σ)-almost surely the expectations in different periods form a decreasing
sequence v0 ≥ v1 ≥ ... ≥ vT = v(cθ). By super-additivity in losses, ∑Tt=1 µ(vt − vt−1) ≤
µ(vT − v0) = µ(v(cθ)− v0). This shows P(M,σ)-almost surely the ex-post news utility in state
θ is no larger than µ(v(cθ)− v0), the news utility from one-shot resolution.
Let E be the event where the receiver’s expectation strictly decreases two or more times.
From the definition of strict gradual bad news, there exists some θ∗ ∈ ΘB so that P(M,σ)[E |
θ∗] > 0. On E ∩ {θ∗}, ∑Tt=1 µ(vt − vt−1) < µ(v(cθ∗) − v0) from super-additivity in losses,
which means the expected news utility conditional on E ∩ {θ∗} is strictly lower than that
of one-shot resolution. Combined with the fact that the ex-post news utility in state θ∗
is always weakly lower than µ(v(cθ∗) − v0), this shows expected news utility in state θ∗ is
strictly lower than that of one-shot resolution.
Conditional on any state θ ∈ ΘG, there is some random period t∗ ∈ {0, ..., T − 1} so that
vt is weakly decreasing up to t = t∗ and vt = v(cθ) for t > t∗. If t∗ = 0, then this belief path
yields the same news utility as one-shot resolution. If t∗ ≥ 1, then the total news utility is∑t∗
t=1 µ(vt− vt−1) +µ(v(cθ)− vt∗). By sub-additivity in gains,
∑t∗
t=1 µ(vt− vt−1) ≤ µ(vt∗− v0),
and for the same reason, µ(v(cθ)−vt∗) ≤ µ(v0−vt∗)+µ(v(cθ)−v0) as we must have vt∗ ≤ v0.
Total news utility is therefore bounded above by µ(vt∗ − v0) + µ(v0 − vt∗) + µ(v(cθ) − v0).
By weak loss aversion, µ(vt∗ − v0) + µ(v0 − vt∗) ≤ 0, therefore total news utility is no larger
than that of one-shot resolution, µ(v(cθ)− pi0).
A.4 Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. Suppose the condition in Proposition 7 holds. So in particular, it holds for q = pi0.
Consider any information structure (M,σ) and its induced distribution over posterior beliefs
in state G, η ∈ ∆([0, 1]). If there exists 0 < x < pi0 such that η(x) > 0, then we can
“split posterior x into 0 and pi0”: that is, we can construct another information structure
(M˜, σ˜) with induced distribution η˜ ∈ ∆([0, 1]), so that η˜(x) = 0, η˜(0) = η(0) + η(x)(1− x
pi0
),
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η˜(pi0) = η(pi0) + η(x) xpi0 . Information structure (M˜, σ˜) gives strictly higher news utility than
(M,σ), since the condition implies U1(x | pi0) < (1− xpi0 ) · U1(0 | pi0) + xpi0 · U1(pi0 | pi0).
Conversely, suppose every information structure (M,σ) with induced posterior distribu-
tion η such that η(x) > 0 for some 0 < x < pi0 is strictly suboptimal. Then, there must
exist an optimal information structure, (M˜, σ˜) with posterior distribution η˜, so that η˜ is
supported on two points: 0 and some q > pi0. (If no information at period 1 is optimal, then
one-shot resolution at period 1 is also optimal, which has η˜(0) > 0.) If there exists some
point p ∈ (0, pi0) that violates the condition of Proposition 7 for this q, that is U1(p | pi0) is
at least as large as the height of the chord connecting (0, U1(0 | pi0)) and (q, U1(q | pi0)), then
an information structure inducing the posterior beliefs p and q would strictly dominate the
optimal information structure, which is impossible.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. We have
d
dp
U(p | pi0) = 2αp − αn − βp + 2βppi0 + p(−2αp + 2βp + 2αn + 2βn) + p2(−3βp − 3βn)
Further, p times slope of chord is:
U(p | pi0)− U(0 | pi0) =U(p | pi0)− (βnpi20 − αnpi0)
=pi0(−αp + αn) + pi20(−βp − βn) + p(2αp − αn − βp)
+ p2(−αp + βp + αn + βn) + p3(−βp − βn) + ppi0(2βp)
Equating p · d
dp
U(p | pi0) = U(p | pi0)− U(0 | pi0), we get
pi0(αn − αp)− (βp + βn)pi20 = p2(αn − αp + βn + βp)− p3(2βp + 2βn).
Define c = αn−αp
βn+βp . Note that c ∈ [0, 1) by assumptions in the statement of the Proposition.
Corollary 3 allows us to define p(pi0, c) as an implicit function through pi0c− pi20 = p2(1 +
c)− 2p3.
We characterize first the derivative of p w.r.t. pi0.
We check the conditions of the implicit function theorem in our setting: define the
function f(pi0, p, c) = p2(1 + c) − 2p3 − pi0c + pi20 with domain (0, 1)3. We look at the case
c = 0 separately in the end. We need ∂pf(pi0, p, c) 6= 0. If this is true, then we can solve for
p(pi0, c) locally and also calculate its derivative. We note that ∂pf(pi0, p, c) = 2p(1 + c)− 6p2.
Hence, ∂pf(pi0, p, c) is zero if p = 1+c3 =: pˆ ∈ [13 , 23 ]. Now, for a fixed c, we see if there is a pi0
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that would give pˆ. This involves solving for pi0 in quadratic equation
pi20 − pi0c+
1
27(1 + c)
3 = 0. (1)
The discriminant as a function of c is given as D(c) = c2 − 427(1 + c)3. Note that D′(c) =
2
9(2 − c)(2c − 1). In particular, D is decreasing from c = 0 to c = 12 and increasing from
then on until c = 1. We note also that D(0) < 0, D(1) < 0 so that overall it follows that
D(c) < 0 for all c ∈ [0, 1]. In particular, it holds that Equation (1) has no solution. This
means that ∂pf never changes sign in (0, 1)3 ∩ {(p, pi0, c) : pi0c− pi20 = p2(1 + c)− 2p3}. This
also implies that p(pi0) > 1+c3 , for all c, pi0 ∈ (0, 1). Recall here that f is a smooth function
on its domain. Thus, implicit function theorem is applicable for all (pi0, c) ∈ (0, 1)2.
Totally differentiating, we get:
dpi0 · (αn − αp)− (βp + βn)2pi0 · dpi0 = 2p · dp · (αn − αp + βn + βp)− 3p2 · dp · (2βp + 2βn),
which can be rearranged to dp
dpi0
1
p
= c−2pi02p2(1+c)−6p3 . The steps above showed that the denominator
of this expression never changes sign. Given that we know it is negative at c = 0 and f
is continuously differentiable, we conclude that the denominator is always negative for all c
and all pi0 ∈ (0, 1). It follows that unless c = 0, p(pi0) is falling until the prior characterized
in the statement of the Proposition and increasing afterwards.
For the case c = 0 one looks at the implicitly defined function p(pi0) through 2p3(pi0) −
p2(pi0) = pi20. Solving with similar steps as above one finds, it is strictly increasing and it is
strictly above 13 for all pi0 ∈ (0, 1).
Summarizing, the amount of optimal good news can always be solved explicitly under the
condition that c ∈ [0, 1) and it is always strictly above max{pi0, 13}. It is strictly increasing
in the prior in the absence of loss aversion and otherwise U-shaped.
Next, we focus on the derivative of p w.r.t. c as defined implicitly through pi0c − pi20 =
p2(1 + c)− 2p3. We fix pi0 ∈ (0, 1) and we look at the function f : (0, 1)× (0, 1) → R given
by f(c, p) = p2(1 + c)− 2p3 − (pi0c− pi20). The calculations above show that fp 6= 0 for every
(c, p) ∈ (0, 1)2. Hence, the implicit function theorem is applicable and we can calculate
p
dp
dc
= pi0 − p
2
2(1 + c)− 6p.
Above we showed that the denominator of this expression is strictly negative. Next we show
that p(c) > √pi0 for all c ∈ (0, 1). Note that the function p 7→ p2(1 + c) − 2p3 is strictly
decreasing in p for p > 1+c3 . This can be established by looking at first order derivatives. We
note also that pi0(1 + c)−2√pi0pi0 > pi0c−pi20 is equivalent to 1−2
√
pi0 +pi = (1−√pi0)2 > 0,
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which is true by virtue of pi0 < 1. This, and the strict monotonicity of p 7→ p2(1 + c)− 2p3
for p > 1+c3 implies that p(c) >
√
pi0 for all c, pi0 ∈ (0, 1). This establishes the result.
Summarizing, the amount of optimal good news is increasing in loss aversion as measured
by αn−αp and decreasing in the amount of diminishing sensitivity, as measured by βn+βp.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 9
We begin by giving some additional definition and notation.
For p, pi ∈ [0, 1], let NG(p; pi) := µ(p− pi) + µ(1− p).
We state a preliminary lemma about NG and NB.
Lemma A.1. Suppose µ exhibits diminishing sensitivity and greater sensitivity to losses.
Then, p 7→ NG(p; pi) is strictly increasing on [0, pi] and symmetric on the interval [pi, 1]. For
each p1 ∈ [pi, 1], there exists exactly one point p2 ∈ [pi, 1] so that NG(p1; pi) = NG(p2; pi).
For every pL < pi and pH ≥ pi, NG(pL; pi) < NG(pH ; pi). Also, NB(p; pi) is symmetric on
the interval [0, pi]. For each p1 ∈ [0, pi], there exists exactly one point p2 ∈ [0, pi] so that
NB(p1; pi) = NB(p2; pi).
Consider any period T − 2 history hT−2 in any equilibrium (M,σ∗, p∗) where p∗(hT−2) =
pi ∈ (0, 1). Let PG and PB represent the sets of posterior beliefs induced at the end of T − 1
with positive probability, in the good and bad states. The next lemma gives an exhaustive
enumeration of all possible PG, PB.
Lemma A.2. The sets PG, PB belong to one of the following cases.
1. PG = PB = {pi}
2. PG = {1}, PB = {0}
3. PG = {p1} for some p1 ∈ (pi, 1) and PB = {0, p1}
4. PG = {pi, 1} and PB = {0, pi}
5. PG = {p1, p2} for some p1 ∈ (pi, 1+pi2 ), p2 = 1− p1 + pi, PB = {0, p1, p2}.
We now give the proof of Proposition 9.
Proof. Consider any period T − 2 history hT−2 with p∗(hT−2) ∈ (0, 1). By Lemma 2,
NB(p; p∗(hT−2)) > NB(0; p∗(hT−2)) for all p ∈ (p∗(hT−2), 1]. Therefore, cases 3 and 5 are
ruled out from the conclusion of Lemma A.2. This shows that after having reached his-
tory hT−2, the receiver will get total news utility of µ(1 − p∗(hT−2)) in the good state and
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µ(−p∗(hT−2)) in the bad state. This conclusion applies to all period T−2 histories (including
those with equilibrium beliefs 0 or 1). So, the sender gets the same utility as if the state is
perfectly revealed in period T − 1 rather than T , and the equilibrium up to period T − 1
form an equilibrium of the cheap talk game with horizon T − 1. By backwards induction, we
see that along the equilibrium path, whenever the receiver’s belief updates, it is updated to
the dogmatic belief in θ.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 10
Proof. The conclusions of Lemmas A.1 and A.2 continue to hold, since these only depend
on µ exhibiting greater sensitivity to losses. As in the proof of Proposition 9, we only need
to establish NB(p; pi0) > NB(0; pi0) for all p ∈ (pi0, 1] to rule out cases 3 and 5 from Lemma
A.2 and hence establish our result.
For p = pi0 +z where z ∈ (0, 1−pi0], NB(p; pi0)−NB(0;pi0) = µ(z)+µ(−(pi0 +z))−µ(−pi0).
Consider the RHS as a function D(z) of z. Clearly D(0) = 0, and D′(z) = µ′(z)−µ′(−(pi0 +
z)). Since minz∈[0,1−pi0]
µ
′ (z)
µ′ (−(pi0+z)) > 1, we get D
′(z) > 0 for all z ∈ [0, 1− pi0], thus D(z) > 0
on the same range.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 11
Proof. By the proof of Proposition 12, which does not depend on this result, there is a GGN
equilibrium with one intermediate belief p ∈ (pi0, 1) whenever NB(p; pi0) = NB(0; pi0). In this
equilibrium, the sender induces a belief of either p or 0 by the end of period 1, then babbles
in all remaining periods of communication. Since the sender is indifferent between inducing
belief p or 0 in the bad state, this equilibrium gives the same payoff as the babbling one in
the bad state. But, since µ(p − pi0) + µ(1 − p) > µ(1 − pi0) due to strict concavity of µ˜pos,
the receiver gets strictly higher news utility in the good state.
To find λ¯ that guarantees the existence of a p solving NB(p; pi0) = NB(0; pi0), let D(p) :=
NB(p; pi0)−NB(0; pi0).We have D(pi0) = 0 and limp→pi+0 D
′(p) = limx→0+ µ˜
′
pos(x)−µ′(−pi0) =
limx→0+ µ˜
′
pos(x)− λµ′(pi0). For any finite λ, this limit is ∞, since limx→0+ µ˜′pos(x) =∞. On
the other hand, D(1) = µ(1− pi0) + µ(−1)− µ(−pi0) = µ˜pos(1− pi0)− λ(µ˜pos(1)− µ˜pos(pi0)).
Since µ˜pos(1) − µ˜pos(pi0) > 0, we may find a large enough λ¯ ≥ 1 so that µ˜pos(1 − pi0) −
λ¯(µ˜pos(1)− µ˜pos(pi0)) < 0. Whenever λ ≥ λ¯, we therefore get D(pi0) = 0, limp→pi+0 D
′(p) =∞,
and D(1) < 0. By the intermediate value theorem applied to the continuous D, there exists
some p ∈ (pi0, 1) so that D(p) = 0.
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A.9 Proof of Proposition 12
Proof. Let J intermediate beliefs satisfying the hypotheses be given. We construct a gradual
good news equilibrium where pt = q(t) for 1 ≤ t ≤ J , and pt = q(J) for J + 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1.
Let M = {g, b} and consider the following strategy profile. In period t ≤ J where the
public history so far ht−1 does not contain any b, let σ(ht−1;G)(g) = 1, σ(ht−1;B)(g) = x
where x ∈ (0, 1) satisfies pt−1
pt−1+(1−pt−1)x = pt. But if public history contains at least one
b, then σ(ht−1;G)(b) = 1 and σ(ht−1;B)(b) = 1. Finally, if the period is t > J , then
σ(ht−1;G)(b) = 1 and σ(ht−1;B)(b) = 1. In terms of beliefs, suppose ht has t ≤ J and every
message so far has been g. Such histories are on-path and get assigned the Bayesian posterior
belief. If ht has t ≤ J and contains at least one b, then it gets assigned belief 0. Finally, if
ht has t > J , then ht gets assigned the same belief as the subhistory constructed from its
first J elements. It is easy to verify that these beliefs are derived from Bayes’ rule whenever
possible.
We verify that the sender has no incentive to deviate. Consider period t ≤ J with history
ht−1 that does not contain any b. The receiver’s current belief is pt−1 by construction.
In state B, we first calculate the sender’s equilibrium payoff after sending g. The re-
ceiver will get some I periods of good news before the bad state is revealed, either by the
sender or by nature in period T. That is, the equilibrium news utility with I periods of
good news is given by ∑Ii=1 µ(pt−1+i − pt−2+i) + µ(−pt−1+I). Since pt−1+I ∈ P ∗(pt−2+I), we
have NB(pt−1+I ; pt−2+I) = NB(0; pt−2+I), that is to say µ(pt−1+I − pt−2+I) + µ(−pt−1+I) =
µ(−pt−2+I). We may therefore rewrite the receiver’s total news utility as ∑I−1i=1 µ(pt−1+i −
pt−2+i) + µ(−pt−2+I). But by repeating this argument, we conclude that the receiver’s total
news utility is just µ(−pt−1). Since this result holds regardless of I’s realization, the sender’s
expected total utility from sending g today is µ(−pt−1), which is the same as the news util-
ity from sending b today. Thus, sender is indifferent between g and b and has no profitable
deviation.
In state G, the sender gets at least µ(1 − pt−1) from following the equilibrium strategy.
This is because the receiver’s total news utility in the good state along the equilibrium path
is given by ∑J−(t−1)i=1 µ(pt−1+i − pt−2+i) + µ(1− pt−1+I). By sub-additivity in gains, this sum
is strictly larger than µ(1−pt−1). If the sender deviates to sending b today, then the receiver
updates belief to 0 today and belief remains there until the exogenous revelation, when belief
updates to 1. So this deviation gives the total news utility µ(−pt−1) + µ(1). We have
µ(1) < µ(1− pt−1) + µ(pt−1)
≤ µ(1− pt−1)− µ(−pt−1),
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where the first inequality comes from sub-additivity in gains, and the second from weak loss
aversion. This shows µ(−pt−1) + µ(1) < µ(1− pt−1), so the deviation is strictly worse than
sending the equilibrium message.
Finally, at a history containing at least one b or a history with length K or longer, the
receiver’s belief is the same at all continuation histories. So the sender has no deviation
incentives since no deviations affect future beliefs.
For the other direction, suppose by way of contradiction there exists a gradual good news
equilibrium with the J intermediate beliefs q(1) < ... < q(J). For a given 1 ≤ j ≤ J, find
the smallest t such that pt = q(k−1) and pt+1 = q(k). At every on-path history ht ∈ H t with
p∗(ht) = pt, we must have σ∗(ht;B) inducing both 0 and q(j) with strictly positive probability.
Since we are in equilibrium, we must have µ(−q(j−1)) being equal to µ(q(j)− q(j−1)) plus the
continuation payoff. If j = J , then this continuation payoff is µ(−q(j)) as the only other
period of belief movement is in period T when the receiver learns the state is bad. If
j < J, then find the smallest t¯ so that pt¯+1 = q(j+1). At any on-path ht¯ ∈ H t¯ which is
a continuation of ht, we have p∗(ht¯) = q(j) and the receiver has not experienced any news
utility in periods t+2, ..., t¯. Also, σ∗(ht¯;B) assigns positive probability to inducing posterior
belief 0, so the continuation payoff in question must be µ(−q(j)). So we have shown that
µ(−q(j−1)) = µ(q(j) − q(j−1)) + µ(−q(j)), that is NB(q(j); q(j−1)) = NB(0; q(j−1)).
A.10 Proof of Proposition 13
Proof. Since NB(p; pi)−NB(0;pi) = 0 for p = pi and ∂∂pNB(p; pi)|p=pi > 0, NB(p; pi)−NB(0;pi)
starts off positive for p slightly above pi. Given that |P ∗(pi)| ≤ 1, if we find some p′ > pi with
NB(p
′ ; pi)−NB(0; pi) > 0, then any solution to NB(p; pi)−NB(0;pi) = 0 in (pi, 0) must lie to
the right of p′ .
If q(j), q(j+1) are intermediate beliefs in a GGN equilibrium, then by Proposition 12,
q(j) ∈ P ∗(q(j−1)) and q(j+1) ∈ P ∗(q(j)). Let p′ = q(j) + (q(j) − q(j−1)). Then,
NB(p
′ ; q(j))−NB(0; q(j)) = µ(p′ − q(j)) + µ(−p′)− µ(−q(j))
= µ(q(j) − q(j−1)) + µ(−q(j) − (q(j) − q(j−1)))− µ(−q(j))
> µ(q(j) − q(j−1)) + µ(−q(j−1) − (q(j) − q(j−1)))− µ(−q(j−1)),
where the last inequality comes from diminishing sensitivity. But, the final expression is
NB(q(j); q(j−1)) −NB(0; q(j−1)), which is 0 since q(j) ∈ P ∗(q(j−1)). This shows we must have
q(j+1) − q(j) > q(j) − q(j−1).
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OA 1 Omitted Proofs from the Appendix
OA 1.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. (1) Suppose µ is two-part linear with µ(x) = x for x ≥ 0, µ(x) = λx for x < 0,
where λ ≥ 0. Suppose v(cA) = 1, v(cB) = 0. In each period, E[µ(pit − pit−1)] = E[(pit −
pit−1)+ − λ(pit − pit−1)−]. By the martingale property, E[(pit − pit−1)+] = E[(pit − pit−1)−],
so E[µ(pit − pit−1)] = 12(1 − λ)E[|pit − pit−1|]. This shows total expected news utility is
E[∑Tt=1 µ(pit − pit−1)] = 12(1 − λ)E[∑Tt=1 |pit − pit−1|]. Note that E[∑Tt=1 |pit − pit−1|] is strictly
larger for gradual information than for one-shot information. If λ > 1, the agent strictly
prefers one-shot information. If 0 ≤ λ < 1, the agent strictly prefers gradual information. If
λ = 1, the agent is indifferent.
Now suppose v(cA) = 0, v(cB) = 1. By the same arguments, total expected news utility is
E[∑Tt=1 µ(ρt−ρt−1)] = 12(1−λ)E[∑Tt=1 |ρt−ρt−1|]. Note that E[∑Tt=1 |ρt−ρt−1|] is strictly larger
for gradual information than for one-shot information. So again, if λ > 1, the agent strictly
prefers one-shot information. If 0 ≤ λ < 1, the agent strictly prefers gradual information. If
λ = 1, the agent is indifferent.
(2) Anticipatory utility. If u is linear, then the agent is indifferent between gradual and
one-shot information regardless of the sign of v(cA)− v(cB). If u is strictly concave, then for
1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1, E[u(pit)] < u(pi0) and E[u(ρt)] < u(ρ0) by combining the martingale property
and Jensen’s inequality. So the agent strictly prefer to keep his prior beliefs until the last
period and will therefore choose one-shot information, regardless of the sign of v(cA)−v(cB).
(3) Suspense and surprise. Ely, Frankel, and Kamenica (2015) mention a “state-dependent”
specification of their surprise and suspense utility functions. With two states, A and B, their
specification uses weights αA, αB > 0 to differentially re-scale belief-based utilities for move-
ments in the two different directions. Specifically, their re-scaled suspense utility is
T−1∑
t=0
u
(
Et
[
αA · (pit+1 − pit)2 + αB · (ρt+1 − ρt)2
])
1
and their re-scaled surprise utility is
E
[
T∑
t=1
u
(
αA · (pit+1 − pit)2 + αB · (ρt+1 − ρt)2
)]
.
Wemay consider agents with opposite preferences over states A and B as agents with different
pairs of scaling weights (αA, αB). Specifically, say there are αHigh > αLow > 0. For an agent
preferring A, αA = αHigh, αB = αLow. For an agent preferring B, αA = αLow, αB = αHigh. But
note that we always have pit+1 − pit = −(ρt+1 − ρt), so along every realized path of beliefs,
(pit+1 − pit)2 = (ρt+1 − ρt)2. This means these two agents with the opposite scaling weights
actually have identical objectives and therefore will have the same preference over gradual
or one-shot information.
OA 1.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. We first justify by backwards induction that the value function is indeed given by
U∗t (x) = (cavUt(· | x)) (x), for all x ∈ ∆(Θ) and all t ≤ T − 1, and that it is continuous in x.
If the receiver enters period t = T − 1 with the belief x ∈ ∆(Θ), the sender faces the
following maximization problem.
[QT−1] max
η∈∆(∆(Θ)),E[η]=x
∫
∆(Θ)
UT−1(p | x)dη(p).
This is because any sender strategy σT−1 induces a Bayes plausible distribution of posterior
beliefs, η with E[η] = x, and conversely every such distribution can be generated by some
sender strategy, as in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). It is well-known that the value
of problem QT−1 is (cavUT−1(· | x)) (x), justifying U∗T−1(x) as the value function for any
x ∈ ∆(Θ). The objective in QT−1 is continuous in p (by assumption on N) and hence in η,
and furthermore the constraint set {η ∈ ∆(∆(Θ)) : E[η] = x} is continuous in x. Therefore,
x 7→ U∗T−1(x) is continuous by Berge’s Maximum Theorem.
Assume that we have shown that value function is continuous and given by U∗t (x) for all
t ≥ S. If the receiver enters period t = S − 1 with belief x, then the sender’s value must be:
[Qt] max
η∈∆(∆(Θ)),E[η]=x
∫
∆(Θ)
N(p | x) + U∗t+1(p)dη(p)
using the inductive hypothesis that U∗t+1(p) is the period t + 1 value function. But N(p |
x) + U∗t+1(p) = Ut(p | x) by definition, and it is continuous by the inductive hypothesis. So
by the same arguments as in the base case, U∗S−1(x) is the time-(S − 1) value function and
it is continuous, completing the inductive step.
2
In the first period, by Carathéodory’s theorem, there exist weights w1, ..., wK ≥ 0, beliefs
q1, ..., qK ∈ ∆(Θ), with ∑Kk=1wk = 1, ∑Kk=1wkqk = x, such that U∗1 (pi0) = ∑Kk=1wkU1(qk |
pi0). Having now shown U∗2 is the period-2 value function, there must exist an optimal
information structure where σ1(· | θ) induces beliefs qk with probability wk. This information
structure induces one of the beliefs q1, ..., qK in the second period. Repeating the same
procedure for subsequent periods establishes the proposition.
OA 1.3 Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. We verify Proposition 4’s condition µ(1−v0)−µ(−v0)+µ′(0+)−µ′(1−v0)+µ(−1) > 0,
which is equivalent to µ′(0+) + µ(1− pi0)− µ(−pi0) > −µ(−1) + µ′(1− pi0). We have that
LHS = αp + αp(1− pi0)− βp(1− pi0)2 − [βnpi20 − αnpi0]
RHS = [−βn + αn] + [αp − 2βp(1− pi0)]
By algebra, LHS −RHS = (1− pi0)(αp − αn) + (1− pi20)(βp + βn). Given that (αn − αp) ≤
(βp + βn) and 1− pi20 > 1− pi0 for 0 < pi0 < 1,
LHS −RHS > −(1− pi20)(βp + βn) + (1− pi20)(βp + βn) = 0.
OA 1.4 Proof of Corollary 2
Proof. This follows from Proposition 4 because µ′(0+) =∞ for the power function.
OA 1.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Suppose Θ = {θ1, ..., θK} and assume without loss the states are associated with
consumption levels c1 < ... < cK .
Let the message space be M = {m1, ...,mK ,m∗}. In the first period,
• σ1(mk | θk) = 1 for 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 2,
• σ1(m∗ | θK−1) = 1,
• σ1(m∗ | θK) = pi0(θK−1)1−pi0(θK) ,
• σ1(mK | θK) = 1− σ1(m∗ | θK).
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Figure OA.1: New belief about consumption after the muddled message m∗ in an environ-
ment with 4 states, compared with the old belief given by the prior pi0.
So, message mk perfectly reveals state θk, whereas m∗ is a “muddled” message that implies
the state is either θK−1 or θK . By simple algebra, the probability that the receiver assigns
to state θK after m∗ is the same as the prior belief,
P[θK | m∗] = pi0(θK) · σ1(m∗ | θK)
pi0(θK) · σ1(m∗ | θK) + pi0(θK−1) · 1 = pi0(θK).
In the second period, the information structure perfectly reveals the true state regardless
of the last message, σ2(mk | θk) = 1 for all 1 ≤ k ≤ K.
To compute the news utility of the muddled message m∗, note that at percentiles p ∈
[0, pi0(θ1)), the change in p-percentile consumption utility is v(cK−1)−v(c1). Similarly, for 2 ≤
k ≤ K−2, the change in consumption utility at percentile p ∈
[∑k−1
j=1 pi0(θj), pi0(θk) +
∑k−1
j=1 pi0(θj)
)
is v(cK−1)− v(ck). There are no changes at percentiles above ∑K−2j=1 pi0(θj).
If θ = θK−1, total news utility from receiving m∗ then mK−1 is[
K−2∑
k=1
pi0(θk) · µ(v(cK−1)− v(ck))
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
from m∗ in period 1
+ pi0(θK) · µ(v(cK−1)− v(cK))︸ ︷︷ ︸
from mK−1 in period 2
.
This is identical to the news utility from one-shot resolution in state θK−1. Similarly, the
information structure just constructed gives the same news utility as one-shot resolution
when the state is θk for 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 2, and when the state is θK and the receiver gets mK
in period 1.
When the receiver sees m∗ in period 1 and mK in period 2 in state θK , an event that
happens with strictly positive probability since pi0(θK−1) < 1 − pi0(θK) as K ≥ 3, he gets
strictly more news utility than from one-shot resolution.
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If θ = θK , total news utility from receiving m∗ then mK is[
K−2∑
k=1
pi0(θk) · µ(v(cK−1)− v(ck))
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
from m∗ in period 1
+
[
K−1∑
k=1
pi0(θk) · µ(v(cK)− v(cK−1))
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
from mK in period 2
,
while one-shot resolution gives ∑K−1k=1 pi0(θk) · µ(v(cK) − v(ck)). For each 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 2
(non-empty since K ≥ 3),
µ(v(cK)− v(cK−1)) + µ(v(cK−1)− v(ck)) > µ(v(cK)− v(ck))
by sub-additivity in gains. This shows the constructed information structure gives strictly
more news utility.
OA 1.6 Proof of Corollary 3
We first state a sufficient condition for the sub-optimality of information structures with
partial bad news with T = 2. Consider the chord connecting (0, U1(0 | pi0)) and (pi0, U1(pi0 |
pi0)) and let `(x) be its height at x ∈ [0, pi0]. Let D(x) := `(x)− U1(x | pi0).
Lemma OA.1. For this chord to lie strictly above U1(p | pi0) for all p ∈ (0, pi0), it suffices
that D′(0) > 0, D′(pi0) < 0, and D
′′(p) = 0 for at most one p ∈ (0, pi0).
Now we verify that the condition in Lemma OA.1 holds for the quadratic news utility,
which in turn verifies the condition of Proposition 7 for q = pi0 and shows partial bad news
information structures to be strictly suboptimal.
Proof. Clearly, D(p) is a third-order polynomial, so D′′(p) has at most one root.
For p < pi0, we have the derivative
d
dp
U(p | pi0) =2βn(p− pi0) + αn + αp(1− p)− βp(1− p)2
+ p(−αp + 2βp(1− p))− (βnp2 − αnp) + (1− p)(2βnp− αn)
The slope of the chord between 0 and pi0 is: αp − βp + (2βp − αp + αn)pi0 − (βp + βn)pi20. So,
after straightforward algebra, D′(0) = (2(βp + βn) − (αp − αn))pi0 − (βp + βn)pi20. Applying
weak loss aversion with z = 1, αp − αn ≤ βp − βn. This shows
D
′(0) ≥ (2(βp + βn)− (βp − βn))pi0 − (βp + βn)pi20
= (βp + βn)pi0(1− pi0) + 2βnpi0 > 0
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for 0 < pi0 < 1.
We also derive D′(pi0) = (αp−2βp−2βn−αn)pi0+(2βp+2βn)pi20. Note that this is a convex
parabola in pi0, with a root at 0. Also, the parabola evaluated at 1 is equal to αp − αn ≤ 0,
where the inequality comes from the weak loss aversion with z = 0. This implies D′(pi0) < 0
for 0 < pi0 < 1.
OA 1.7 Proof of Lemma OA.1
Proof. We need D > 0 in the region (0, pi0). We know that D(0) = D(pi0) = 0. Given the
conditions in the statement and the twice-differentiability of D in (0, pi0) it follows that D′′
changes sign only once. Moreover, it also follows that D > 0 in a right-neighborhood of x = 0
and a left-neighborhood of x = pi0. Suppose D has an interior minimum at x0 ∈ (0, pi0).
Then it holds D′′(x0) ≥ 0.
Suppose D′′(x) > 0 for all small x. Then it follows x0 ≤ p, where we set p = pi0 if p
doesn’t exist. Because D′′(x) ≥ 0 for all x ≤ p we have that D′(x) > 0 for all x ≤ p. In
particular also D(x) > 0 for all such x due to the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus. Thus,
the interior minimum is positive and so the claim about D in (0, pi) is proven in this case.
Suppose instead that D′′(x) < 0 for all x near enough to 0. Then it follows that x0 ≥ p.
In particular, for all x > p we have D′′(x) > 0. Since the derivative is strictly increasing for
all x ∈ (x0, pi0) and D′(pi0) < 0 we have that D′(x) < 0 for all x ∈ (x0, pi0). In particular,
from the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus, D(pi0) is strictly below D(x0). Since D(pi0) = 0
we have again that D(x0) > 0.
Given the boundary values of D and the signs of the derivatives at 0, pi0 and that any
interior minimum of D is strictly positive, we have covered all cases and so shown that D > 0
in (0, pi0).
OA 1.8 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Part 1. Fix a prior pi0 and a pair (M¯, σ¯) which induces an equilibrium as in Definition
3. We focus on the case that |M¯ | > 2 as the other cases are trivial.
LetM = {g, b} and we will inductively define the sender’s strategy σt on t so that (M,σ)
is another equilibrium which delivers the same expected utility as (M¯, σ¯). In doing so we
will successively define a sequence of subsets of histories, H tint ⊆ M t and H¯ tint ⊆ M¯ t, which
are length t histories associated with interior equilibrium beliefs about the state in the new
and old equilibria, as well as a map φ that associates new histories to old ones.
Let H0int = H¯0int := {∅}, φ(∅) = ∅.
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Once we have defined σt−1, H t−1int , H¯ t−1int and φ : H t−1int → H¯ t−1int , we then define σt. If
ht−1 /∈ H t−1int , then simply let σt(ht−1, θ)(g) = 0.5 for both θ ∈ {G,B}. For each ht−1 ∈ H t−1int ,
by the definition of H¯ t−1int , the equilibrium belief pit−1 associated with φ(ht−1) in the old
equilibrium satisfies 0 < pit−1 < 1. Let ΦG(ht−1) and ΦB(ht−1) represent the sets of posterior
beliefs that the sender induces with positive probability in the good and bad states following
public history φ(ht−1) ∈ H¯ t−1int in (M¯, σ¯).
We must have ΦG(ht−1)\ΦB(ht−1) ⊆ {1} and ΦB(ht−1)\ΦG(ht−1) ⊆ {0}, since any mes-
sage unique to either state is conclusive news of the state. We construct σt(ht−1, θ) based on
the following four cases.
Case 1: 1 ∈ ΦG(ht−1) and 0 ∈ ΦB(ht−1). Let σt(ht−1, G) assign probability 1 to g and let
σt(ht−1, B) assign probability 1 to b.
Case 2: 1 ∈ ΦG(ht−1) but 0 /∈ ΦB(ht−1). By Bayesian plausibility, there exists some
smallest q∗ ∈ (0, pit−1) with q∗ ∈ ΦG(ht−1) ∩ ΦB(ht−1), induced by some message m¯b ∈ M¯
sent with positive probabilities in both states. Also, some message m¯g ∈ M¯ sent with positive
probability in state G induces belief 1. Let σt(ht−1, B)(b) = 1 and let σt(∅, G)(b) = x where
x ∈ (0, 1) solves pit−1x
pit−1x+(1−pit−1) = q
∗.
Case 3: 1 /∈ ΦG(ht−1) but 0 ∈ ΦB(ht−1). By Bayesian plausibility, there exists some
largest q∗ ∈ (pit−1, 1) with q∗ ∈ ΦG(ht−1) ∩ ΦB(ht−1). Let σt(ht−1, G)(g) = 1 and let
σt(ht−1, B)(g) = x where x ∈ (0, 1) solves pit−1pit−1+(1−pit−1)x = q∗.
Case 4: 1 /∈ ΦG(ht−1) and 0 /∈ ΦB(ht−1). By Bayesian plausibility, ΦG(ht−1) = ΦB(ht−1),
and there exist some largest qL ≤ pit−1 and smallest qH ≥ pit−1 in this common set of
posterior beliefs, and further there exist x, y ∈ (0, 1) so that pit−1x
pit−1x+(1−pit−1)y = qH and
pit−1(1−x)
pit−1(1−x)+(1−pit−1)(1−y) = qL. Let σ(h
t−1, G)(g) = x and σ(ht−1, B)(g) = y.
Having constructed σt, let H tint be those on-path period t histories with interior equilib-
rium beliefs, that is ht = (ht−1,m) ∈ H tint if and only if ht−1 ∈ H t−1int and σ(ht−1, θ)(m) > 0
for both θ ∈ {G,B}. A property of the construction of σt is that if ht−1 ∈ H t−1int , then both
(ht−1, g) and (ht−1, b) are on-path. That is, off-path histories can only be continuations of
histories with degenerate beliefs in {0, 1}.
Let H¯ tint be on-path period t histories with interior equilibrium beliefs in (M¯, σ¯). By the
definition of σt, there exists m¯ ∈ M¯ so that ht induces the same equilibrium belief in the
new equilibrium as the history (φ(ht−1), m¯) ∈ H¯ tint in the old equilibrium, and we define
φ(ht) := (φ(ht−1), m¯).
The receiver’s expected payoff in both the B and G states are the same as in the old
equilibrium. To see this, note that by our construction, the receiver’s expected payoff in
state B is the same as if we took a deterministic selection of messages m1,m2, ... in the old
equilibrium with the property that σ1(∅, B)(m1) > 0 and, for t ≥ 2, σt(m1, ...,mt−1, θ)(mt) >
7
0. Then, we had the sender play message mt in period t. Since this sequence of messages is
played with positive probability in state B of the old equilibrium, it must yield the expected
payoff under B — if it yields higher or lower payoffs, then we can construct a deviation that
improves the receiver’s ex-ante expected payoffs in the old equilibrium. A similar argument
holds for state G.
It remains to check that (M,σ) is an equilibrium by ruling out one-shot deviations. We
argued before that all off-path histories must follow an on-path history with equilibrium belief
in 0 or 1. There are no profitable deviations at off-path histories or at on-path histories with
degenerate beliefs, because the receiver does not update beliefs after such histories regardless
of the sender’s play.
So consider an on-path history with a non-degenerate belief, i.e. a member ht ∈ H tint.
A one-shot deviation following ht corresponds to a deviation following φ(ht) in (M¯, σ¯), and
must not be strictly profitable.
Part 2. We now turn to the second claim. If T ≤ T ′ , then for any equilibrium with
horizon T, we may construct an equilibrium of horizon T ′ which sends messages in the same
way in periods 1, ..., T − 1, but babbles starting in period T . This equilibrium has the same
expected payoff as the old one.
Note that the first claim of Lemma 1 also holds for the infinite horizon model of Online
Appendix OA 2.3. Nothing in the argument relies on T being finite. This is because the
proof argument relies on the one-shot deviation property which holds for equilibria in both
finite and infinite horizon models. Thus, in particular, in the proof of Proposition OA.2 we
can also focus on a binary signal space.
OA 1.9 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Due to sub-additivity,
µ(p) < µ(p− pi) + µ(pi). (2)
Note that symmetry implies µ(−p) = −µ(p) and that µ(−pi) = −µ(pi). Rearranged (2) is
precisely N(0; pi) < N(p; pi).
OA 1.10 Proof of Lemma A.1
Proof. We have ∂NG(p;pi)
∂p
= µ′(p−pi)−µ′(1− p). For 0 ≤ p < pi and under greater sensitivity
to losses, µ′(p−pi) ≥ µ′(pi− p). Since µ′′(x) < 0 for x > 0, µ′(pi− p) > µ′(1− p). This shows
∂NG(p;pi)
∂p
> 0 for p ∈ [0, pi).
The symmetry results follow from simple algebra and do not require any assumptions.
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Note that ∂2NG(p;pi)
∂p2 = µ
′′(p − pi) + µ′′(1 − p) < 0 for any p ∈ [pi, 1], due to diminishing
sensitivity. Combined with the required symmetry, this means ∂NG(p;pi)
∂p
crosses 0 at most once
on [pi, 1], so for each p1 ∈ [pi, 1], we can find at most one p2 so that NG(p1; pi) = NG(p2; pi). In
particular, this implies at every intermediate p1 ∈ (pi, 1), we get NG(p1; pi) > NG(pi; pi) since
we already have NG(1;pi) = NG(pi; pi). This shows NG(·; pi) is strictly larger on [pi, 1] than on
[0, pi).
A similar argument, using µ′′(x) > 0 for x < 0, establishes that for each p1 ∈ [0, pi], we
can find at most one p2 so that NB(p1; pi) = NB(p2; pi).
OA 1.11 Proof of Lemma A.2
Proof. Suppose |PG| = 1.
If PG = {pi}, then any equilibrium message not inducing pi must induce 0. By the Bayes’
rule, the sender cannot induce belief 0 with positive probability in the bad state, so PB = {pi}
as well.
If PG = {1}, then any equilibrium message not inducing 1 must induce 0. Furthermore,
the sender cannot send equilibrium messages inducing belief 1 with positive probability in
the bad state, else the equilibrium belief associated with these messages should be strictly
less than 1. Thus PB = {0}.
If PG = {p1} for some 0 ≤ p1 < pi, then any equilibrium message not inducing p1 must
induce 0. This is a contradiction since the posterior beliefs do not average out to pi.
This leaves the case of PG = {p1} for some pi < p1 < 1. Any equilibrium message not
inducing p1 must induce 0. Furthermore, the sender must induce the belief p1 in the bad
state with positive probability, else we would have p1 = 1. At the same time, the sender
must also induce belief 0 with positive probability in the bad state, else we violate Bayes’
rule. So PB = {0, p1}.
Now suppose |PG| = 2.
In the good state, the sender must be indifferent between two beliefs p1, p2 both induced
with positive probability. By Lemma A.1, NG(p; pi) is strictly increasing on [0, pi] and strictly
higher on [pi, 1] than on [0, pi), while for each p1 ∈ [pi, 1], there exists exactly one point p2 ∈
[pi, 1] so that NG(p1; pi) = NG(p2; pi). This means we must have p1 ∈ [pi, 1+pi2 ], p2 = 1− p1 +pi.
If PG = {pi, 1}, any equilibrium message not inducing pi or 1 must induce 0. Also, 1 /∈ PB,
because any message sent with positive probability in the bad state cannot induce belief 1.
We cannot have PB = {0}, because then the message inducing belief pi actually induces 1.
We cannot have PB = {pi} for then we violate Bayes’ rule. This leaves only PB = {0, pi}.
If PG = {p1, p2} for some p1 ∈ (pi, 1+pi2 ), then any equilibrium message not inducing p1
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or p2 must induce 0. Also, p1, p2 ∈ PB, else messages inducing these beliefs give conclusive
evidence of the good state. By Bayes’ rule, we must have PB = {0, p1, p2}.
It is impossible that |PG| ≥ 3, since, by Lemma A.1, NG(p; pi) is strictly increasing on [0, pi]
and strictly higher on [pi, 1] than on [0, pi), while for each p1 ∈ [pi, 1], there exists exactly one
point p2 ∈ [pi, 1] so that NG(p1; pi) = NG(p2; pi). So the sender cannot be indifferent between
3 or more different posterior beliefs of the receiver in the good state.
OA 1.12 Proof of Corollary 4
Proof. First, µ exhibits greater sensitivity to losses, because µ(−x) = −λµ(x) for all x > 0
and we have λ ≥ 1.
To apply Proposition 10, we only need to verify that minz∈[0,1−pi0]
µ
′ (z)
µ′ (−(pi0+z)) > 1. For
the λ-scaled µ, minz∈[0,1−pi0]
µ
′ (z)
µ′ (−(pi0+z)) =
1
λ
· minz∈[0,1−pi0] µ˜
′
pos(z)
µ˜′pos(pi0+z)
. The assumption that
minz∈[0,1−pi0]
µ˜
′
pos(z)
µ˜′pos(pi0+z)
> λ gives the desired conclusion.
OA 1.13 Proof of Corollary 5
Proof. We apply Proposition 12 to the case of quadratic news utility. Recall the relevant
indifference equation in the good state.
µ(−qt) = µ(qt+1 − qt) + µ(−qt+1). (3)
Plugging in the quadratic specification and algebraic transformations lead to
0 = (αp − αn)(qt+1 − qt)− βp(qt+1 − qt) + βn(qt+1 − qt)(qt+1 + qt)
Define r = qt+1 − qt. Then this relation can be written as
(βp − βn)r2 + (αn − αp − 2βnqt)r = 0,
i.e. r is a zero of a second order polynomial. For P ∗ to be non-empty we need this root r
to be in (0, 1 − qt). In particular the peak/trough r¯ of the parabola defined by the second
order polynomial should satisfy r¯ ∈ (0, 1−qt2 ). Given that r¯ = 2βnqt−(αn−αp)2(βp−βn) for the case that
βp 6= βn, we get the equivalent condition on the primitives 0 < 2βnqt−(αn−αp)2(βp−βn) < 1−qt2 . The
root r itself is given by r = 2βnqt−(αn−αp)
βp−βn , which leads to the recursion
qt+1 = qt
βp + βn
βp − βn −
αn − αp
βp − βn . (4)
10
This leads to the formula for P ∗(pi) in part 1).
Case 1: When βp < βn the coefficient in front of qt is negative so that the recursion in
Equation (4) leads to
qt+1 − qt = qt 2βn
βp − βn −
αn − αp
βp − βn < 0.
This also shows that for the case that βp < βn, a GGN equilibrium with 1 or more interme-
diate beliefs only exists when the prior is low enough: namely pi0 < αn−αp2βn =: q
∗.
Case 2: When βp > βn the slope in Equation (4) is above 1 so that for all priors pi0 large
enough we get an increasing sequence qt which satisfies Equation (3). It is also easy to see
from Equation (4) that
(qt+2 − qt+1)− (qt+1 − qt) =
(
βp + βn
βp − βn − 1
)
> 0,
proving the statement in the text after the corollary.
That an equilibrium can exist where partial good news are released for more than two
periods, is shown by the example in the main text following the statement of the Corollary
(see Figure 5).
OA 1.14 Proof of Corollary 6
Proof. We verify the sufficient condition in Proposition 13. We get ∂
∂p
NB(p; pi) = α(p−pi)1−α −
λα
p1−α , so
∂
∂p
NB(p; pi)|p=pi =∞.
To show that |P ∗(pi)| ≤ 1, it suffices to show that ∂
∂p
NB(p; pi) = 0 for at most one p > pi.
For the derivative to be zero, we need ( p
p−pi )
1−α = λ. As the LHS is decreasing for p > pi, it
can have at most one solution.
OA 2 A Random-Horizon Model
In this section, we study a version of our information design problem without a deterministic
horizon. Each period, with probability 1−δ ∈ (0, 1], the true state of the world is exogenously
revealed to the receiver and the game ends. Until then, the informed sender communicates
with the receiver each period as in the model from Section 2. We verify that our results from
the finite-horizon setting extend analogously into this random-horizon environment.
11
OA 2.1 The Environment
Consider an environment where the consumption event takes place far in the future, but
the sender is no longer the receiver’s only source of information in the interim. Instead, a
third party perfectly discloses the state to the receiver with some probability each period.
For instance, the sender may be the chair of a central bank who has decided on the bank’s
monetary policy for next year and wishes to communicate this information over time, while
the third party is an employee of the bank who also knows the planned policy. With some
probability each period, the employee goes to the press and leaks the future policy decision.
Time is discrete with t = 0, 1, 2, ... The sender commits to an information structure (M,σ)
at time 0. The information structure consists of a finite message space M and a sequence
of message strategies (σt)∞t=1 where each σt(· | ht−1, θ) ∈ ∆(M) specifies how the sender will
mix over messages in period t as a function of the public history ht−1 so far and the true
state θ.
The sender learns the state at the beginning of period 1 and sends a message according
to σ1. At the start of each period t = 2, 3, 4, ..., there is probability (1 − δ) ∈ (0, 1] that
the receiver exogenously and perfectly learns the state θ. If so, the game effectively ends
because no further communication from the sender can change the receiver’s belief. If not,
then the sender sends the next message according to σt. The randomization over exogenous
learning is i.i.d. across periods, so the time of state revelation (i.e., the horizon of the game)
is a geometric random variable.
OA 2.2 The Value Function with Commitment
Let Vδ : [0, 1] → R be the value function of the problem with continuation probability δ —
that is, Vδ(p) is the highest possible total expected news utility up to the period of state
revelation, when the receiver holds belief p in the current period and state revelation does
not happen this period. The value function satisfies the recursion Vδ(p) = V˜δ(p | p), where
V˜δ(· | p) := cavq[µ(q − p) + δVδ(q) + (1− δ)(q · µ(1− q) + (1− q) · µ(−q))].
Ely (2017) studies an infinite-horizon information design problem whose value function also
involves concavification. Unlike in Ely (2017), the current belief enters the objective function
for our news-utility problem.
Our first result shows this recursion has a unique solution which increases in δ for any
fixed p ∈ [0, 1].
12
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Figure OA.2: The value function for δ = 0, 0.8, 0.95. Consistent with Proposition OA.1, the
value function is pointwise higher for higher δ.
Proposition OA.1. For every δ ∈ [0, 1), the value function Vδ exists and is unique. Fur-
thermore, Vδ(p) is increasing in δ for every p ∈ [0, 1].
Figure OA.2 illustrates this result by plotting Vδ(p) for the quadratic news utility with
αp = 2, αn = 2.1, βp = 1, and βn = 0.2 for three different values of δ : 0, 0.8, and 0.95. (In
fact, the monotonicity of the value function in δ also holds when there are more than two
states.)
The monotonicity of Vδ in δ says that when the sender is benevolent and has commitment
power, third-party leaks are harmful for the receiver’s expected welfare. This result can
be explained intuitively as follows. Just as with increasing T in the finite-horizon model,
increasing δ expands the set of implementable belief paths. The idea behind implementing
a payoff from a shorter horizon / lower δ is that the sender switches to babbling forever
after certain histories. This switching happens at a deterministic calendar time in the finite-
horizon setting but at a random time in the random-horizon setup, mimicking the random
arrival of the state revelation period.
OA 2.3 Gradual Good News Equilibria Without Commitment
Now we turn to equilibria of the random-horizon cheap talk game when the sender lacks
commitment power. Analogously to the case of finite horizon, a strict gradual good news
equilibrium (strict GGN) features a deterministic sequence of increasing posteriors q(0) <
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q(1) < . . . such that q(0) = pi0 is the receiver’s prior before the game starts and q(t) is his
belief in period t, provided state revelation has not occurred. An analog of Proposition 12
continues to hold.
Proposition OA.2. Let P ∗(pi) ⊆ (pi, 1] be those beliefs p satisfying NB(p; pi) = NB(0; pi).
Suppose µ exhibits diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion. There exists a gradual good
news equilibrium with a (possibly infinite) sequence of intermediate beliefs q(1) < q(2) < ... if
and only if q(j) ∈ P ∗(q(j−1)) for every j = 1, 2, ..., where q(0) := pi0.
The P ∗ set is the same in the finite- and random-horizon environments. Corollary 6 then
implies that even in the random-horizon environment where the game could continue for
arbitrarily many periods, intermediate beliefs grow at an increasing rate in GGN equilibria
for quadratic and square-roots µ, and there exists a finite bound on the number of periods
of informative communication that applies for all δ ∈ [0, 1).
OA 2.4 Proofs
OA 2.4.1 Proof of Proposition OA.1
Proof. Consider the following operator φ on the space of continuous functions on [0, 1]. For
V : [0, 1]→ R, define φ(V )(p) := V˜ (p | p), where
V˜ (· | p) := cavq[µ(q − p) + δV (q) + (1− δ)(q · µ(1− q) + (1− q) · µ(−q))].
We show that φ satisfies the Blackwell conditions and so is a contraction mapping.
Suppose that V2 ≥ V1 pointwise. Then for any p, q ∈ [0, 1],
µ(q−p)+δV2(q)+(1−δ)(qµ(1−q)+(1−q)µ(−q)) ≥ (q−p)+δV1(q)+((1−δ)(qµ(1−q)+(1−q)µ(−q))
therefore V˜2(· | p) ≥ V˜1(· | p) pointwise as well. In particular, V˜2(p | p) ≥ V˜1(p | p), that is
φ(V2)(p) ≥ φ(V1)(p).
Also, let k > 0 be given and let V2 = V1 + k pointwise. It is easy to see that V˜2(· | p) =
V˜1(· | p)+δk for every p, because the argument to the concavification operator will be point-
wise higher by δk. So in particular, φ(V2)(p) = φ(V1)(p) + δk. By the Blackwell conditions,
the operator φ is a contraction mapping on the metric space of continuous functions on [0, 1]
with the supremum norm. Thus, the value function exists and is also unique.
To show pointwise monotonicity in δ, suppose 0 ≤ δ < δ′ < 1. First, Vδ(0) = Vδ(1) = 0 for
any δ ∈ [0, 1). Now consider an environment where full revelation happens at the end of each
period with probability 1−δ, and fix a prior p ∈ (0, 1). There exists some binary information
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structure with message space M = {0, 1}, public histories H t = (M)t for t = 0, 1, ..., and
sender strategies (σt)∞t=0 with σt : H t×Θ→ ∆(M), such that (M,σ) induces expected news
utility of Vδ(p) when starting at prior p.
We now construct a new information structure, (M¯, σ¯) to achieve expected news utility
Vδ(p) when starting at prior p in an environment where full revelation happens at the end of
each period with probability 1−δ′ , with δ′ > δ. Let M¯ = {0, 1,∅}. The idea is that when full
revelation has not happened, there is a 1− δ
δ′ probability each period that the sender enters
into a babbling regime forever. When the sender enters the babbling regime at the start of
period t + 1, the receiver’s expected utility going forward is the same as if full revelation
happened at the start of t+ 1.
To implement this idea, after any history ht ∈ H t not containing ∅, let
σ¯t+1(ht; θ) =

∅ w/p 1− δ
δ′
1 w/p δ
δ′ · σt+1(ht; θ)(1)
0 w/p δ
δ′ · σt+1(ht; θ)0)
.
That is, conditional on not entering the babbling regime, σ¯ behaves in the same way as σ.
But, after any history ht ∈ H t containing at least one ∅, σ¯t+1(ht; θ) = ∅ with probability
1. Once the sender enters the babbling regime, she babbles forever (until full revelation
exogenously arrives at some random date). We need to verify that payoff from this strategy
is indeed Vδ(p). Fix a history ht not containing ∅ and a state θ, and suppose p∗(ht) = q.
Under σ¯t+1, with probability of (1 − δ′) + δ′(1 − δδ′ ) = 1 − δ the receiver gets the expected
babbling payoff qµ(1 − q) + (1 − q)µ(−q) in the period of state revelation. Analogously,
under σt+1, there is probability 1 − δ that state revelation happens in period t + 1 and the
receiver gets qµ(1− q) + (1− q)µ(−q) in expectation. With probability δ′ δ
δ′ = δ, the receiver
facing σ¯ gets the payoff induced by σt+1(ht; θ) in period t + 1 and the same distribution
of continuation histories as under σ. The same argument applies to all these continuation
histories, so σ¯ must induce the same expected payoff as σ when starting at (ht; θ).
OA 2.4.2 Proof of Proposition OA.2
Proof. We show first sufficiency. Consider the following strategy profile. In period t where
the public history so far ht−1 does not contain any b, let σ(ht−1;G)(g) = 1, σ(ht−1;B)(g) = x
where x ∈ (0, 1) satisfies pt−1
pt−1+(1−pt−1)x = pt. But if public history contains at least one b,
then σ(ht−1;G)(b) = 1 and σ(ht−1;B)(b) = 1. In terms of beliefs, suppose ht is so that every
message so far has been g. Such histories are on-path and get assigned the Bayesian posterior
belief. If ht contains at least one b, then belief is 0. It is easy to verify that these beliefs are
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derived from Bayes’ rule whenever possible.
We verify that the sender has no incentive to deviate. Consider period t with history
ht−1 that does not contain any b. The receiver’s current belief is pt−1 by construction.
In state B, we first calculate the sender’s equilibrium payoff after sending g. For any
realization of the exogenous revelation date, the receiver’s total news utility in the good
state along the equilibrium path is given by ∑Jj=1 µ(pt−1+j − pt−2+j) + µ(−pt−1+J) for some
integer J ≥ 1. Since pt−1+J ∈ P ∗(pt−2+J), we have NB(pt−1+J ; pt−2+J) = NB(0; pt−2+J),
that is to say µ(pt−1+J − pt−2+J) + µ(−pt−1+J) = µ(−pt−2+J). We may therefore rewrite
the receiver’s total news utility as ∑J−1j=1 µ(pt−1+j − pt−2+j) + µ(−pt−2+J). But by repeating
this argument, we conclude that the receiver’s total news utility is just µ(−pt−1). Since
this result holds regardless of J , the sender’s expected total utility from sending g today
is µ(−pt−1), which is the same as the news utility from sending b today. Thus, sender is
indifferent between g and b and has no profitable deviation.
In state G, the sender gets at least µ(1 − pt−1) from following the equilibrium strategy.
This is because for any realization of the exogenous revelation date, the receiver’s total news
utility in the good state along the equilibrium path is given by ∑Jj=1 µ(pt−1+j − pt−2+j) +
µ(1− pt−1+J) for some integer J ≥ 1. By sub-additivity in gains, this sum is strictly larger
than µ(1− pt−1). If the sender deviates to sending b today, then the receiver updates belief
to 0 today and belief remains there until the exogenous revelation, when belief updates to
1. So this deviation has the total news utility µ(−pt−1) + µ(1). We have
µ(1) < µ(1− pt−1) + µ(pt−1)
≤ µ(1− pt−1)− µ(−pt−1),
where the first inequality comes from sub-additivity in gains, and the second from weak loss
aversion. This shows µ(−pt−1) + µ(1) < µ(1− pt−1), so the deviation is strictly worse than
sending the equilibrium message.
Finally, at a history containing at least one b, the receiver’s belief is the same at all
continuation histories. So the sender has no deviation incentives since no deviations affect
future beliefs.
We now show necessity. Suppose that we have a (possibly infinite) gradual good news
equilibrium given by the sequence p0 < p1 < · · · < pt < . . . . By Bayesian plausibility and
because we are focusing on two-message equilibria the sender must be sending the messages
{0, pt} in period t if the state is bad. The sender must thus be indifferent between these two
posteriors in the bad state. Formally, NB(0; pt) = NB(pt+1; pt) for all t ≥ 0, as long as there
is no babbling. Written equivalently in the language of P ∗: pt+1 ∈ P ∗(pt) for all t ≥ 0, as
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long as there’s no babbling, where here p0 = pi0.
OA 3 Additional Results about News Utility with Di-
minishing Sensitivity
OA 3.1 Preference for Dominated Consumption Lotteries
So far, we have taken the prior distribution over states pi0 ∈ ∆(Θ) as exogenously given.
Fixing an information structure, a news-utility agent may strictly prefer a dominated dis-
tribution over states. This distinguishes our news-utility preference from other preferences,
such as recursive preferences and Gul, Natenzon, and Pesendorfer (2019)’s risk consumption
preference.
We now give an example. Suppose T = 2 and there are two states, Θ = {G,B}. Normalize
consumption utility to be v(cG) = 1, v(cB) = 0. Let the news utility function be µ(z) =
√
z
for z ≥ 0, µ(z) = −λ√−z for z < 0, where λ ≥ 1. At time t = 0, the agent holds a prior
belief pi0 with pi0(G) = p ∈ [0, 1]. At time t = 1, the agent learns the state perfectly, so pi1
is degenerate with probability 1. Consumption takes place at time t = 2. For any λ, the
agent strictly prefers state G for sure (pi0(G) = 1) over state B for sure (pi0(G) = 0), as
both environments provide zero news utility. But, the agent may strictly prefer state B for
sure over an interior probability of the good state, pi0(G) = p. In fact, this happens when
p + p
√
1− p − λ(1 − p)√p < 0, which says λ >
√
p(1+
√
1−p)
1−p . A sufficiently loss-averse agent
may strictly prefer no chance of winning a consumption lottery than a low chance of winning.
OA 3.2 Residual Consumption Uncertainty
OA 3.2.1 A Model of Residual Consumption Uncertainty
In the main text, we studied a model where the sender has perfect information about the
receiver’s final-period consumption level.
Now suppose the sender’s information is imperfect. In state θ, the receiver will consume
a random amount c in period T + 1, drawn as c ∼ Fθ, deriving from it consumption utility
v(c). As before, v is a strictly increasing consumption-utility function. We interpret the
state θ as the sender’s private information about the receiver’s future consumption, while
the distribution Fθ captures the receiver’s residual consumption uncertainty conditional on
what the sender knows. The case where Fθ is degenerate for every θ ∈ Θ nests the baseline
model.
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Assume that Ec∈F
θ
′ [v(c)] 6= Ec∈F
θ
′′ [v(c)] when θ
′ 6= θ′′ . We may without loss normalize
minθ∈Θ Ec∈Fθ [v(c)] = 0, maxθ∈Θ Ec∈Fθ [v(c)] = 1.
The mean-based news-utility function N(pit | pit−1) in this environment is the same as
in the environment where the receiver always gets consumption utility Ec∼Fθ [v(c)] in state
θ. This is because given a pair of beliefs Fold, Fnew ∈ ∆(Θ) about the state, the receiver
derives news utility N(Fnew | Fold) based on the difference in expected consumption utilities,
µ(Ec∼Fnew [v(c)] − Ec∼Fold [v(c)]). So, all of the results in the paper concerning mean-based
news utility immediately extend. The two results in the paper that are not specific to mean-
based news utility, Propositions 3 and 4, apply to any functions N(pit | pit−1) satisfying the
continuous differentiability condition stated in Section 2, without requiring any relationship
between N and consumptions in different states.
We now define N using Kőszegi and Rabin (2009)’s percentile-based news-utility model
with a power-function gain-loss utility, in an environment with residual consumption un-
certainty. We apply Proposition 4 to the resulting N and show that one-shot resolution is
strictly sub-optimal. This result applies for any K ≥ 2.
Corollary OA.1. Consider the percentile-based model with µ(x) =
x
α x ≥ 0
−λ(−x)α x < 0
for
0 < α < 1, λ ≥ 1. Suppose there are two states θG, θB ∈ Θ with distributions of consumption
utilities v(FθB) = Unif[0, L], v(FθG) = J + v(FθB) for some L, J > 0. One-shot resolution is
strictly suboptimal for any finite T .
Proof. We show that lim→0 N(1G|(1−)1G⊕1B) =∞ under this set of conditions. The argument
behind Proposition 4 then implies some information structure involving perfect revelation of
states other than θG, θB, one-shot bad news, partial good news for the two states θG, θB is
strictly better than one-shot resolution.
For r ∈ [0, 1], write Fr for the distribution of consumption utilities under the belief
r1G ⊕ (1− r)1B.
Note we must have
∫ 1
0 cF1(q)− cF1−(q)dq = J, and that cF1(q)− cF1−(q) ≥ 0 for all q.
Let q∗ = min( · J/L, ). It is the quantile at which cF1−(q∗) = J .
For all q ≥ q∗, cF1(q)− cF1−(q) ≤ L.
Case 1: J ≥ L, so q∗ = .
∫ q∗
0
cF1(q)− cF1−(q)dq =
∫ 
0
J − q · 1

· ((1− )L)dq
= J− 12(1− )L.
This implies
∫ 1
q∗ cF1(q)− cF1−(q)dq = 12(1− )L.
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The worst case is when the difference is L on some q-interval, and 0 elsewhere. For small
 < 0 so that L < 1,
∫ 1
q∗
(cF1(q)− cF1−(q))αdq ≥ (L)α ·
(1/2) · (1− )L
L
= 12(L)
α(1− ).
Therefore, for small  > 0, N(1G|(1−)1G⊕1B)

= 12
1
1−αL
α(1− ), which diverges to∞ as → 0.
Case 2: J < L, so q∗ = J/L.
∫ J/L
0
cF1(q)− cF1−(q)dq =
∫ J/L
0
J − q · 1
J/L
(J − J
L
 · L)dq
= 12
J2
L
+ 12
J2
L2
2L
<
1
2J+
1
2L
2
using J < L. This then implies
∫ 1
q∗ cF1(q)− cF1−(q)dq > 12J− 12L2.
So, again using the worst-case of the difference being L on some q-interval, and 0 else-
where,
N(1G | (1− )1G ⊕ 1B)

>
1

(L)α ·
1
2J− 12L2
L
= 1
1−α
Lα ·
(1
2J/L−
1
2
)
.
As → 0, RHS converges to ∞.
OA 3.2.2 A Calibration Comparing Percentile-Based News Utility and Mean-
Based News Utility
Since Proposition 3’s procedure for computing the optimal information structure applies to
general N , including both the percentile-based and the mean-based news-utility functions in
an environment with residual consumption uncertainty, we can compare the solutions to the
sender’s problem for these two models.
Consider two states of the world, Θ = {G,B}. For some σ > 0, suppose consumption
is distributed normally conditional on θ with FG = N (1, σ2), FB = N (0, σ2), consumption
utility is v(x) = x, and gain-loss utility (over consumption) is µ(x) =
√
x for x ≥ 0,
µ(x) = −1.5√−x for x < 0. We calculated the optimal information structure for the mean-
based model in an analogous environment, as reported in Figure 2.
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With the percentile-based model, an agent who believes P[θ = G] = pi has a belief over
final consumption given by a mixture normal distribution, piFG ⊕ (1 − pi)FB, illustrated in
Figure OA.3.
We plot in Figure OA.4 the optimal information structures for T = 5, σ = 1. The optimal
information structures for σ = 0.1, 1, 10 all involve gradual good news, one-shot bad news.
Table OA.1 lists the optimal disclosure of good news over time. Not only are the shapes of
the concavification problems qualitatively similar to those of the mean-based model, but the
resulting optimal information structures also bear striking quantitative similarities.
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 t = 5
percentile-based, σ = 0.1 0.50 0.55 0.61 0.69 0.80 1.00
percentile-based, σ = 1 0.50 0.55 0.62 0.71 0.83 1.00
percentile-based, σ = 10 0.50 0.56 0.63 0.72 0.84 1.00
mean-based, any σ 0.500 0.556 0.626 0.715 0.834 1.000
Table OA.1: Optimal disclosure of good news. The optimal information structure under
a square-root gain-loss function with λ = 1.5 takes the form of gradual good news, one-
shot bad news both in the mean-based model and the percentile-based model for T = 5,
σ = 0.1, 1, 10. The table shows belief movements conditional on the good state in different
periods.
From Table OA.1, it appears that percentile-based and mean-based models deliver more
similar results for larger σ2. We provide an analytic result consistent with the idea that these
two models generate similar amounts of news utility when the state-dependent consumption
utility distributions have large variances.
Proposition OA.3. Suppose Θ = {B,G} and the distributions of consumption utilities in
states B and G are Unif[0, L] and Unif[d, L+ d] respectively, for L, d > 0. Let Nperc(p2 | p1)
be the news utility associated with changing belief in θ = G from p1 to p2 in a percentile-based
news-utility model with a continuous gain-loss utility µ. Then,
lim
L→∞
(
sup
0≤p1,p2≤1
|Nperc(p2 | p1)− µ[(p2 − p1)d]|
)
= 0.
In a uniform environment, if there is enough unresolved consumption risk even conditional
on the state θ, then the difference between percentile-based news utility and mean-based news
utility goes to zero uniformly across all possible belief changes.12
Proof. Let Fp(x) be the distribution function of the mixed distribution p · Unif[d, L + d] ⊕
(1 − p) · Unif[0, L], and F−1p (q) its quantile function for q ∈ [0, 1]. By a simple calculation,
12Lemma 3 in the Online Appendix of Kőszegi and Rabin (2009) states a similar result, but for a different
order of limits.
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Figure OA.3: The densities and CDFs of final consumption utility distributions under two
beliefs about P[θ = G], pi = 0.1 and pi = 0.9. The dashed black lines in the CDFs plot
show the differences in consumption utilities at the 25th percentile, 50th percentile, and
75th percentile levels between these two beliefs. The news utility associated with updating
belief from pi = 0.1 to pi = 0.9 in the percentile-based model is calculated by applying a
gain-loss function µ to all these differences in consumption utilities at various quantiles,
then integrating over all quantiles levels in [0, 1].
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Figure OA.4: The concavifications giving the optimal information structure with horizon
T = 5, gain-loss function µ(x) =

√
x for x ≥ 0
−1.5√−x for x < 0 , prior pi0 = 0.5, using Kőszegi and
Rabin (2009)’s percentile-based model in a Gaussian environment with σ = 1. The y-axis
in each graph shows the sum of news utility this period and the value function of entering
next period with a certain belief.
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F−1p (d/L) = d+pd and F−1p (1−d/L) = L+pd−d. At the same time, for d/L ≤ q ≤ 1−d/L
where q = d/L+ y, we have F−1p (q) = d+ pd+ yL.
This shows that over the intermediate quantile values between d/L and 1− d/L,
∫ 1−d/L
d/L
µ
[
F−1p2 (q)− F−1p1 (q)
]
dq =
∫ 1−d/L
d/L
µ [(p2 − p1)d] dq = (1− 2d/L) · µ[(p2 − p1)d].
For the lower part of the quantile integral [0, d/L], using the fact that F−1p (d/L) = d + pd,
we have the uniform bound 0 ≤ F−1p (q) ≤ 2d for all p ∈ [0, 1] and q ≤ d/L. So,∣∣∣∣∣
∫ d/L
0
µ
[
F−1p2 (q)− F−1p1 (q)
]
dq
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ dL · maxx∈[−2d,2d] |µ(x)|.
By an analogous argument,∣∣∣∣∣
∫ 1
1−d/L
µ
[
F−1p2 (q)− F−1p1 (q)
]
dq
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ dL · maxx∈[−2d,2d] |µ(x)|.
So for any 0 ≤ p1, p2 ≤ 1,
|Nperc(p2 | p1)− µ[(p2 − p1)d]| ≤ 2d
L
max
x∈[d,d]
|µ(x)|+ 2d
L
max
x∈[−2d,2d]
|µ(x)|,
an expression not depending on p1, p2. The max terms are seen to be finite by applying
extreme value theorem to the continuous µ, so the RHS tends to 0 as L→∞.
OA 4 Relation to Other Models
OA 4.1 Optimal Information Structure for Anticipatory Utility
We show that if the receiver has anticipatory utility and gets A (∑ pit(θ) · v(cθ)) when she
ends period t with posterior belief pit ∈ ∆(Θ), then a sender with commitment power has an
optimal information structure that only discloses information in period t = 1.
Consider any information structure (M,σ). Find the period t∗ with the highest ex-ante
anticipatory utility, i.e., t∗ ∈ arg max
1≤t≤T−1
E(M,σ) [A (
∑
pit(θ) · v(cθ))]. Consider another informa-
tion structure that generates the (feasible) distribution of beliefs pit∗ in period 1, then reveals
no additional information in periods 2, ..., T−1. This new information structure gives weakly
higher expected anticipatory utility than (M,σ) in every period. Therefore there exists an
optimal information structure that only discloses information in t = 1.
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OA 4.2 Risk Consumption Preferences
Gul, Natenzon, and Pesendorfer (2019) study a model of preference over random evolving
lotteries and propose a class of risk consumption preferences. Translated into our setting,
an agent with risk consumption preference values an information structure (M,σ) according
to utility function
E(M,σ)
[∫
v(u2(pit))dη
]
.
Here u2 : ∆(Θ) → R is affine and v is strictly increasing. The term v(u2(pit)) is viewed as
a function from the time periods {0, 1, ..., T − 1} into the reals and dη denotes the Choquet
integral with respect to a capacity η on {0, 1, ..., T − 1}.
To show that our model of mean-based news utility is not nested under the class of
risk consumption preferences, we show that risk consumption preferences cannot exhibit the
preference patterns from Online Appendix OA 3.1: that is, strictly preferring winning a
lottery for sure to not winning it for sure, but also strictly preferring not winning for sure
to winning with some interior probability p ∈ (0, 1) in the T = 2 setup.
By an abuse of notation, the belief assigning probability q to state G will simply be
denoted q. The first part of the preference gives v(u2(1)) > v(u2(0)), since Choquet integral
of a constant function returns the same constant. When the prior winning probability is
p ∈ (0, 1), the Choquet integrand is either fG : {0, 1} → R with fG(0) = v(u2(p)) and
fG(1) = v(u2(1)), or fB : {0, 1} → R with fB(0) = v(u2(p)) and fB(0) = v(u2(0)). The two
integrands correspond to belief paths where the agent wins or loses the lottery. Since v is
strictly increasing, u2 is affine, and v(u2(1)) > v(u2(0)), we have v(u2(p)) > v(u2(0)). Thus
both fG and fB dominate the constant function v(u2(0)) in every period. By monotonicity
of the Choquet integral, the agent must prefer p probability of winning the lottery to no
chance of winning it.
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